University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

March 2020

Analysis of Malicious Behavior on Social Media Platforms Using
Agent-Based Modeling
Agnieszka Anna Onuchowska
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Onuchowska, Agnieszka Anna, "Analysis of Malicious Behavior on Social Media Platforms Using AgentBased Modeling" (2020). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/8978

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Analysis of Malicious Behavior on Social Media Platforms Using Agent-Based Modeling

by

Agnieszka Anna Onuchowska

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Information Systems and Decision Sciences
Muma College of Business
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: Donald Berndt, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor: Alan Hevner, Ph.D.
Wolfgang Jank, Ph.D.
Sagar Samtani, Ph.D.
George Burruss, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
March 24, 2020

Keywords: Twitter, Malicious Accounts, Tweet Categorization, Agent-Based Modeling, Policy
Interventions
Copyright © 2020, Agnieszka Anna Onuchowska

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................... v
ABSTRACT

............................................................................................................................ viii

CHAPTER 1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6

INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION ................................................................. 1
Research Approach................................................................................................... 3
Research Questions .................................................................................................. 4
Research Design ....................................................................................................... 5
Theoretical Basis ...................................................................................................... 7
Findings and Contributions ....................................................................................... 7
Summary.................................................................................................................. 8

CHAPTER 2.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7

LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 9
Policy Interventions Addressing Malicious Behavior ................................................ 9
Preferential Attachment Theory .............................................................................. 10
Network Interventions and Diffusion of Innovations Theory ................................... 11
Bot Account Characteristics ................................................................................... 11
Human Account Characteristics .............................................................................. 16
Cyborg Account Characteristics.............................................................................. 18
Tweeting Behavior of Bots, Humans and Cyborgs .................................................. 18

CHAPTER 3.
TWITTER
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

IMPLICATIONS OF MALICIOUS ACCOUNTS REMOVAL ON
............................................................................................................................. 21
Background ............................................................................................................ 23
Method and Testbed ............................................................................................... 24
Results ................................................................................................................... 26
Categorizing Donald Trump’s Tweets..................................................................... 27
Discussion .............................................................................................................. 29

CHAPTER 4. UNDERSTANDING MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR ON TWITTER ........................... 31
4.1
Background ............................................................................................................ 33
4.1.1 Accounts’ Behavior Classification .............................................................. 33
4.2
Twitter Account Features – Past Research .............................................................. 35
4.3
Clustering of Twitter Accounts ............................................................................... 36
4.4
Methodology .......................................................................................................... 37
4.4.1 Data Source ................................................................................................ 37
4.5
Account Features .................................................................................................... 40
i

4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10

Data Preparation and Analysis Overview ................................................................ 42
Results ................................................................................................................... 43
Discussion .............................................................................................................. 51
Implications for Research ....................................................................................... 56
Conclusions............................................................................................................ 57

CHAPTER 5. USING AGENT-BASED MODELING TO ADDRESS MALICIOUS
BEHAVIOR ON SOCIAL MEDIA ........................................................................................... 59
5.1
Background and Motivation ................................................................................... 59
5.2
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 61
5.2.1 Agent-Based Models of Twitter Network.................................................... 61
5.2.2 Accounts’ Behavior Classification .............................................................. 65
5.3
Model Definition .................................................................................................... 66
5.3.1 Twitter Model Ecosystem ........................................................................... 66
5.3.2 Agents and Their Behaviors ........................................................................ 68
5.3.3 Communication Mechanism Between Agents ............................................. 73
5.4
Results ................................................................................................................... 76
5.5
Model Validation ................................................................................................... 84
5.6
Discussion .............................................................................................................. 87
CHAPTER 6.
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4

APPLICATION OF THE AGENT-BASED MODEL ............................................. 88
Literature Review ................................................................................................... 89
Proposed Intervention Scenarios ............................................................................. 90
Intervention Results ................................................................................................ 92
Discussion ............................................................................................................ 107

CHAPTER 7. DISSERTATION IMPLICATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH............................................................................................................ 111
7.1
Research Implications........................................................................................... 112
7.2
Practice and Governance Policy Implications........................................................ 114
7.3
Limitations ........................................................................................................... 115
7.4
Future research ..................................................................................................... 116
7.5
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 117
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 118
APPENDIX 1 CLUSTERING OF TWITTER ACCOUNTS – CALCULATIONS ....................... 135
APPENDIX 2 ‘TRMP’ ACCOUNT AGENT RETWEET STATISTICS ..................................... 140
APPENDIX 3 AGENT INTERVENTION STATISTICS ............................................................ 142
APPENDIX 4 PERMISSION DOCUMENTS ............................................................................. 145

ii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Selected Literature on Bot Types’ Classification ....................................................................... 15
Table 2 Selected Literature on Human Accounts Classification .............................................................. 16
Table 3 Retweets’ Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................ 26
Table 4 Results of a Sign Pair T-test ...................................................................................................... 26
Table 5 Selected Literature on Twitter Account Classification ............................................................... 34
Table 6 Twitter Account Features - Review ........................................................................................... 36
Table 7 Twitter Malicious Account Datasets Description ....................................................................... 38
Table 8 Description of Malicious Accounts Examples ........................................................................... 39
Table 9 Description of Account Features ............................................................................................... 40
Table 10 Clusters of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia) .................................................................. 44
Table 11 Clusters of Identified Features – Iran ....................................................................................... 45
Table 12 Clusters of Identified Features – Venezuela ............................................................................. 48
Table 13 Clusters of Identified Features – Russia ................................................................................... 49
Table 14 Identified Features Average Values - Country Comparison...................................................... 52
Table 15 Cluster Representations per Country ....................................................................................... 53
Table 16 Selected Literature on Agent-Based Simulations of Social Media Networks ............................ 62
Table 17 Description of Twitter Network Evaluation Metrics Computed Each Day (Tick) ..................... 68
Table 18 Defined Sets of Characteristics for Simulated Network of Agents ............................................ 69
Table 19 Description of Twitter Agent Account Evaluation Metrics ....................................................... 72
Table 20 Reputation Score, Follower and Retweet Rates by Agent Type ................................................ 79
Table 21 Tweet and Retweeted Rates by Agent Type ............................................................................. 80
Table 22 Simulated Network Statistics................................................................................................... 84
iii

Table 23 Proposed Policy Intervention Scenarios ................................................................................... 90
Table 24 Account and Network Statistics............................................................................................... 91
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia) ........................................... 135
Table A2 Threshold Values of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia) ................................................. 135
Table A3 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Spain (Catalonia) ..................................... 136
Table A4 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Iran ................................................................ 136
Table A5 Threshold Values of Identified Features –Iran ...................................................................... 136
Table A6 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Iran .......................................................... 136
Table A7 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Russia ............................................................ 137
Table A8 Threshold Values of Identified Features –Russia .................................................................. 137
Table A9 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Russia ...................................................... 138
Table A10 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Venezuela .................................................... 138
Table A11 Threshold Values of Identified Features – Venezuela.......................................................... 138
Table A12 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Venezuela .............................................. 138
Table A13 ‘TRMP’ Account Agent Retweet Statistics ......................................................................... 140
Table A14 Policy Intervention Statistics - Amplifier (AMP) ................................................................ 142
Table A15 Policy Intervention Statistics - Broadcaster (BRD).............................................................. 142
Table A16 Policy Intervention Statistics - Celebrity (CLB) .................................................................. 143
Table A17 Policy Intervention Statistics - Commentator (COM) .......................................................... 143
Table A18 Policy Intervention Statistics - Influencer (INF) .................................................................. 144

iv

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 Applied Research Approach in the Dissertation.......................................................................... 4
Figure 2 Donald Trump’s Most Popular Tweet (Left) vs. Least Popular Tweet (Right)........................... 25
Figure 3 Followers Tally (Left); Retweet 3-day/ 10-day Moving Average (Right) .................................. 27
Figure 4 Tale of 141 Donald Trump’s Tweets (November 1-13, 2018)................................................... 28
Figure 5 Retweets Categorization (June-July vs. November 2018) ......................................................... 28
Figure 6 Longevity of Identified Accounts ............................................................................................. 54
Figure 7 Average Likes and Retweets per Tweet per Country ................................................................ 55
Figure 8 Total Likes and Retweets per Country...................................................................................... 56
Figure 9 Creation and Deployment of the ABM Model .......................................................................... 60
Figure 10 Instantiation of Agents and Connection Creation .................................................................... 67
Figure 11 Tweeting and Retweeting Processes - Overview..................................................................... 72
Figure 12 Tweeting and Retweeting Mechanism – Overview ................................................................. 73
Figure 13 Retweeting Process ................................................................................................................ 75
Figure 14 Tweeting Process ................................................................................................................... 76
Figure 15 ABM Simulation Process ....................................................................................................... 77
Figure 16 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem .................................................................................... 80
Figure 17 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem ............................................................................ 81
Figure 18 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem ............................................................................. 82
Figure 19 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem ................................................................................ 82
Figure 20 A Zoom-in on TRMP Agent with a Circle of Followers and Followees .................................. 83
Figure 21 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets (Left) and Trump’s Tweets (Right) ................................ 83
Figure 22 TRMP Account Retweet Rates Before and After Bot Removal............................................... 85
v

Figure 23 Tale of TRMP Retweets Before (Left) and After 99% Bot Removal (Right) ........................... 85
Figure 24 Network Followers Before and After Bot Removal ................................................................ 86
Figure 25 Network Tweets Before and After Bot Removal .................................................................... 86
Figure 26 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 25% Bot Removal ................................................. 92
Figure 27 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 25% Bot Removal.............................................. 93
Figure 28 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal .............................................. 93
Figure 29 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal ...................................... 94
Figure 30 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal.......................................... 94
Figure 31 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal ....................................... 95
Figure 32 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 50% Bot Removal ................................................. 96
Figure 33 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 50% Bot Removal.............................................. 97
Figure 34 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal .............................................. 97
Figure 35 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal ...................................... 98
Figure 36 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal .......................................... 98
Figure 37 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal ....................................... 99
Figure 38 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 75% Bot Removal ............................................... 100
Figure 39 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 75% Bot Removal............................................ 101
Figure 40 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal ............................................ 101
Figure 41 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal .................................... 102
Figure 42 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal........................................ 102
Figure 43 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal ..................................... 103
Figure 44 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 99% Bot Removal ............................................... 104
Figure 45 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 99% Bot Removal............................................ 104
Figure 46 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal ............................................ 105
Figure 47 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal .................................... 105
Figure 48 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal ........................................ 106
vi

Figure 49 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal ..................................... 107
Figure 50 Mean Retweeted Count (BRD, CLB, INF) ........................................................................... 108
Figure 51 Mean Retweeted Count (AMP, COM) ................................................................................. 109
Figure 52 Mean Followers Count per Agent Kind ................................................................................ 109
Figure 53 Mean Retweets Count per Agent Kind ................................................................................. 110

vii

ABSTRACT
The following dissertation focuses on the problem of malicious accounts actions on social media. The
dissertation proposes an artifact in a form of an agent-based model of Twitter network. The model is then
deployed to investigate a policy intervention that aims at controlling malicious behavior on social media
outlets. The main research question is: How can we best intervene in social networks to minimize the
effects of malicious actors? The dissertation consists of four studies that are organized as follows. First
study is designed as an exploratory investigation that deploys descriptive analysis and unsupervised
methods to analyze the types of malicious accounts and their impact on information exchange on social
media. Second study explores malicious behavior on social media and employs cluster analysis to capture
different types of malicious accounts originating from Russia, Iran, Venezuela and Spain (Catalonia).
Third study follows the design science research methodology (Hevner et al., 2004) and builds on the
findings presented in the first part of the dissertation. It incorporates an extensive literature review to
build an agent-based model (ABM) of a simulated Twitter network with defined malicious and legitimate
agents. Fourth study deploys the defined agent-based model to test out a policy-based intervention that
aim to prevent a proliferation of malicious content on a simulated social media network. The dissertation
serves as a next step towards a better understanding of the impact of malicious actions on social media
outlets. It proposes an artifact in the form of an agent-based model that simulates social media network
environment. The proposed simulation captures the complexity of agent behaviors and models the
dynamic interactions between the social media agents. On top of that, the dissertation tests out a sample
social media policy intervention that targets malicious behavior.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Over the past years, social media has become an important medium for public life (Bradshaw and
Howard, 2017), being a global platform that allows people to express their views (Kelly et al., 2012). At
the same time, the emergence of activities instigated by malicious accounts has challenged the
foundations of today’s information society (Ferrara, 2015). Manipulation initiatives have an
overwhelming negative effect on societies (Ferrara, 2015), whereas disinformation campaigns embrace
confusion and distrust and are often used to deepen societal divisions based on nationalistic, racial or
religious strains (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Malicious accounts can exercise a number of disruptive
activities on social media such as populating spam, creating fake accounts, distributing malware or
phishing activities (Adewole et al., 2017). Past reports show that malicious actors’ actions on social
media focus on diverting attention from discussed issues (Bradshaw and Howard, 2017), influencing
beliefs and values of social media users (Gorwa, 2017), providing fake political support (Ratkiewicz et
al., 2011), polarizing discussions on topics related to politics (Salge and Karahanna, 2018) or
manipulating online discussions about presidential elections (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016) by inflating
Twitter trending topics related to a given political candidate (Ferrara et al., 2016).
Bradshaw and Howard (2017) indicate that the first organized attempts to manipulate social
media and nudge public opinion were reported in 2010. As of 2017, organizations that attempted to
manipulate social media outlets were found in 28 countries. Activities that showcased nudging of public
opinion environments were reported both among countries with democratic governments and
authoritarian regimes. On top of that, social media campaigns were found to target both local
populations and global audience, aiming at foreign countries (Bradshaw and Howard, 2017).
Among the biggest challenges related to the governance of social media outlets is the
development of policies, which could minimize the impact of malicious accounts on the information
1

exchange done through social media (Lapowsky, 2018). Social media companies have been actively
targeting malicious accounts, with a goal to reduce their overall number and to minimize the impact of
such accounts’ adverse actions. For example, before the US midterm elections in November 2018,
Facebook and Instagram blocked accounts showing “coordinated inauthentic behavior” that seemed
designed to interfere in the elections’ outcome (Gleicher, 2018). In November 2017, Twitter (2017)
updated their Automation Rules Policy, in which the company publicly communicated that automated
tweets which seeking to manipulate trending topics would be filtered out and any originating accounts
would be suspended. Consequently, to protect Twitter users from manipulation and abuse, the company
decided to remove roughly 70 million suspicious accounts from the network in June and July 2018
(Timberg & Dwoskin, 2018). Targeted accounts had been actively used to propagate and amplify news
of questionable provenance (Fung, 2018). Twitter reported that as a result of the cleanup, some Twitter
accounts owned by politicians (e.g., Barack Obama or Donald Trump) or celebrities (such as Katy Perry,
Justin Bieber, Oprah Winfrey or Ellen DeGeneres) lost significant numbers of followers (Fung, 2018,
Moore, 2018). What is more, in October 2018, Twitter created a data archive “to strengthen Twitter
against attempted manipulation, including malicious automated accounts and spam” (Twitter, 2018). A
published data archive that is posted on Twitter presents removed malicious accounts and their tweets
and other media (such as images or videos) generated by state-backed information operations in Russia,
Venezuela, Spain (Catalonia) and Iran.
The motivation for this dissertation research is as follows. The dissertation investigates whether
an agent-based simulation can serve as an effective prevention mechanism against malicious actions on
social media outlets. The main research question is: How can we intervene in social networks to
minimize the effects of malicious actors? To answer that question the dissertation designs an agent-based
network of Twitter actors and, with the use of such a simulated network, it tests out the effectiveness of
the defined policy intervention. The studies presented in this dissertation employ social network
intervention process (Valente, 2012) which is based on the diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers,
2003). Social network alteration, which is a part of the defined social network intervention process, aims
2

at adding, deleting or rewiring existing nodes or links (Valente, 2012). The dissertation uses the process
to design a social media policy intervention and by this minimize the impact of malicious accounts on
information exchange on Twitter.
1.1

Research Approach

This dissertation presents new insights and methods showcasing prevention of malicious attacks on
social media outlets. Moreover, the dissertation extends the current level of understanding of malicious
behavior, as past studies did not propose full characterization of malicious accounts. The dissertation
comprises four studies, each of which is designed as follows.
First study aims at explaining the impact of malicious actions on social media environments and
helps to understand how the suspension of malicious accounts impacts the propagation of messages on
social media outlets. In this study we conduct a natural experiment and investigate the implications of
Twitter’s cleanup initiatives related to the removal of malicious accounts that follow legitimate accounts.
The study employs descriptive statistical analysis to investigate malicious accounts removal on post
propagation.
Second study investigates emergent behavior of malicious accounts that Twitter tagged as
connected to state-backed information operations, identified as malicious and removed from the Twitter
network. The study employs cluster analysis extract the characteristics of malicious accounts originating
from Russia, Iran, Venezuela and Spain (Catalonia) and their impact on information exchange on social
media. The study extends past research that defined behavioral patterns of malicious actors on Twitter.
Third study is based on the design science approach (Hevner et al., 2004) and follows the action
design research (ADR) approach (Mullarkey and Hevner, 2019). Based on the findings of the second
study and supported by an extensive literature on malicious accounts’ behaviors, it proposes, builds and
evaluates an IS artifact (Hevner et al., 2004) in a form of an agent-based model of a simulated Twitter
network in which malicious and legitimate agents’ behaviors are populated.

3

The fourth study deploys the agent-based model defined in the third study and tests out policy
intervention on simulated scenarios. With the use of an agent-based model, the study evaluates policybased intervention that is used to reduce the impact of malicious behavior propagation on social media
networks. The dissertation follows the action design research (ADR) paradigm’s cycles: (1) Problem
Formulation/ Planning (P), (2) Artifact Creation, (3) Evaluation, (4) Reflection and (5) Learning
(Mullarkey and Hevner, 2019). The process is detailed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Applied Research Approach in the Dissertation

1.2

Research Questions

Using the collected data, the dissertation analyzes malicious accounts’ behaviors, models them and runs
simulations to understand how policy-based interventions can minimize the impact of malicious
behaviors on social media. The main research question in this dissertation is: How can we best intervene
in social networks to minimize the effects of malicious actors? Following the main research question, we
also take the following research questions into consideration.
First study investigates the following research question: How does the removal of malicious
accounts that follow influential people impacts the popularity of tweets posted by such celebrities and
politicians?
Second study investigates the following research questions: (1) What are the characteristics of
malicious behaviors on social networks? (2) How does the removal of malicious accounts impact the
propagation of messages on social networks? The goal behind the presented research questions is to
4

synthesize past research and additional descriptive statistics on message propagation to generate a
typology of malicious actors.
Third study follows the design science method (Hevner et al., 2004) and creates a computational
model as an artifact. The study builds on the findings presented in the second study and, using the agentbased modeling method, designs a model of a Twitter network with defined malicious and legitimate
agents. Third study evaluates the following research question: Can we design and implement an agentbased model of a Twitter-like social network for use in simulation studies?
Fourth study focuses on the following research question: Given specific regulatory policies, can
we evaluate policy alternatives using agent-based modeling and simulation? This research question is
linked to case study scenarios. The study proposes an intervention that allows to validate the agent-based
model proposed in the third study against historical contexts. The dissertation follows the action design
research (ADR) paradigm’s cycles: (1) Problem Formulation/ Planning (P), (2) Artifact Creation, (3)
Evaluation, (4) Reflection and (5) Learning (Mullarkey and Hevner, 2019).
1.3

Research Design

First study applies an exploratory research using descriptive analysis followed by unsupervised methods
to investigate the types of malicious accounts and their impact on information exchange on social media
outlets. The study identifies the characteristics of malicious accounts and we refer to past literature,
which showcased that one can draw inferences about Twitter accounts’ characteristics based on user
metadata without the need to run sentiment analysis (Kelly et al., 2012, Lee et al., 2011). The primary
motivation in this study is to understand (1) how the removal of malicious accounts that follow
influential people impacts the popularity of tweets posted by such celebrities and politicians and (2) to
what extent malicious accounts contribute to the amplification of tweets over the network. This study
serves as a combination of deductive (literature review on the types of Twitter users) and inductive
aspects (data-driven inferences). First, the study investigates how the removal of malicious accounts that
follow legitimate accounts owned by popular people impacts the popularity of tweets posted by
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celebrities and politicians. Second, the study analyzes emergent behavior of malicious accounts that
Twitter tagged as connected to state-backed information operations.
Second study focuses on exploration of the types of malicious behaviors on social media. We
compare the characteristics of malicious account behaviors on Twitter based on the analysis of the
published data archive originating in Spain (Catalonia), Russia, Venezuela and Iran. The study
investigates and compares emergent behavior of accounts that Twitter identified as malicious and
removed from the Twitter network. The study focuses on the analysis of six types of malicious accounts’
features: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account activity
score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet count. With the use of descriptive statistics and
unsupervised learning, the study extends past research that defined behavioral patterns of malicious
actors on Twitter.
The goal of third study is to define a simulated network of Twitter actors. Following the design
philosophy proposed by Simon (1996), third study proposes a design science artifact (Hevner et al.,
2004) in a form of an agent-based model that presents malicious and legitimate agents and their
behaviors. Third study shows how agent-based modeling of a Twitter network can extend current
research on Twitter and contributes to research on controlling malicious accounts in the social media
environment. The definition of the model is based on the findings collected over the literature review
and descriptive analysis presented in the first and second study.
Fourth study deploys the agent-based model defined in Study 3 and tests the implications of
policy implementations on simulated malicious behavior scenarios. Using an agent-based model, the
study investigates a policy intervention that allows to test hypothetical social media policies that target
malicious behavior. For instance, the study looks at the Twitter malicious account removal episodes
from 2018, apply the policies which were defined in the past and then compare the results to historical
data. In order to get a better understanding of the impact of policy applications, the study proposes
simulation tests. Through this, the study analyzes how an application of policy-based intervention affects
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social network dynamics. Also, the study investigates whether the applied social media policy
intervention is effective in reducing the impact of malicious behavior on social media.
1.4

Theoretical Basis

This dissertation uses two theories (diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 2003) and preferential
attachment theory (Barabasi and Albert, 1999)) that support the research on malicious actions on social
media. Third study deploys preferential attachment theory when modeling follower connection rules
between agents. Preferential attachment is one of the core factors that shape the communication
mechanism between agents. Fourth study employs the social network intervention process (Valente,
2012) which is based on the diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 2003). The diffusions of
innovations theory explains how practices and ideas that are new are populated in a networked
community (Valente, 2012). The social network intervention process informs the way in which the study
defines policy interventions designed to minimize the impact of malicious accounts on information
exchange on Twitter. Social network alteration, which is a part of the defined social network
intervention process, aims at adding, deleting or rewiring existing nodes or links (Valente, 2012).
1.5

Findings and Contributions

The dissertation provides the following literature, methodology and practice-oriented contributions and
findings. First, the dissertation summarizes the research conducted in the last couple of years on the
types of social network users and offers and in-depth analysis of the malicious and legitimate types of
behaviors that characterize social media users. Second, the designed IS artifact (the simulated agentbased model of a social media network) helps social media platforms evaluate malicious behavior
polices in a cost- and time-effective way. The intervention applied on the agent-based model helps
determine agents’ actions that result from application of different types of policies. The model has a
potential to also test future complex interventions which would not be possible to execute in a real-life
environment. What is more, the model can be relatively quickly and easily readjusted and recalibrated to
suit the changing characteristics of social media networks. Finally, the findings of policy intervention
7

simulations can help social media platforms design effective malicious accounts’ policies that address a
variety of behaviors of social media users.
1.6

Summary

The advent of social media creates substantial opportunities for connected users to express and share
their ideas. In the same time, social media platforms are targeted by malicious agents whose behaviors
are difficult to understand and prevent. A major challenge introduced by malicious accounts on social
media is the potential for false impressions that are generated or amplified by such accounts.
This dissertation investigates ways to contain malicious behavior on social media outlets. It
presents new insights and methods showcasing prevention of malicious attacks on social media outlets.
Moreover, the dissertation extends the current level of understanding of malicious behavior, as past
studies did not propose full characterization of malicious accounts. First, it identifies the patterns of
activities that characterize the behavior of malicious and legitimate actors on social media outlets and
analyzes consequences of malicious account removal on the behavior of social media network.
Secondly, the dissertation proposes an artifact in a form of an agent-based model to simulate the
behavior of malicious and non-malicious social media account owners. Finally, it applies a policy
intervention onto the simulated social media network and tests out the consequences such intervention
on the network behavior. The presented approach extends current research on policing social media and
proposes a novel agent-based method to minimize the impact of malicious actions on social media
networks.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter discusses the literature review that presents research and concepts related to this
dissertation. First, the study discusses past research on policy interventions on social media that
addresses malicious behavior. Second, the study describes the preferential attachment theory followed
by network interventions and diffusion of innovations theory. Third, the study analyzes research related
to policy governance on social media platforms. Next, the study investigates past research findings on
social media bot accounts characteristics. The study also presents past research on human account types
and we discusses the literature on cyborg account characteristics. Finally, the study discusses past
findings on tweeting behavior of bots, humans and cyborgs.
2.1

Policy Interventions Addressing Malicious Behavior

Grinberg et al. (2019) suggests that social media outlets should actively seek ways that discourage social
media users from following or sharing fake news content. To do that, social media platforms need to
apply policies to prevent unwanted content from flooding the network (Grinberg et al., 2019, Roberts,
2018). Social media policies help leverage responsible use of social media tools and mitigate the risks
related to the use of social media platforms (Hrdinova et al., 2010). Yet, it appears that up to date social
media platforms has failed to successfully address malicious actions resulting in elections manipulation,
fake news propagation or privacy infringement of social media user accounts (Yar, 2018).
Past research that involves the application of policy interventions addressing malicious behavior
is quite scarce. For example, Jardine (2019) proposes a moderation approach (policy application) that
addresses the spread and exchange of malicious content and hate speech between Dark Web and surface
web. The defined four steps include web content production and restrictions (step 1 & 2) followed by
content displacement to the Dark Web (step 3) and Dark Web content percolation from Dark Web back
9

to surface web (step 4). The author argues that it is vital to introduce policies (e.g., content minimization,
takedowns of link aggregators, platform real-name policies) that would control the flow of malicious
content between Dark Web and surface web. Suh et al. (2018) propose two policies (increased
identifiability through social networking service accounts policy and high-quality seed comments
provision policy) to address a problem of malicious comments that spread on social media. Jhaver et al.
(2018) propose hybrid block list to improve malicious content blocking mechanisms and target online
harassment on social media.
2.2

Preferential Attachment Theory

Preferential attachment theory proposed by Barabasi and Albert (1999) serves to explain the way in
which online networks grow. The theory incorporates two mechanisms that characterize online
networks. The first mechanism is characterized by continuous network expansion that follows when new
vertices are added. The second mechanism is characterized by new vertices that prefer to attach to wellconnected nodes rather than nodes that are poorly integrated with the rest of the network (Barabasi and
Albert, 1999). Preferential attachment theory has been successfully deployed in past research on online
networks. For example, Kunegis et al. (2013) argue that online networks follow nonlinear preferential
attachment scheme. Romero and Kleinberg (2010) study directed closure process in information
networks that affect the way in which Twitter links are created. The authors find that, depending on the
groups of followers, directed closure process will differ. Li et al. (2013) conducts an observation of
neighboring links on social media networks and proposed the concept of preferential triadic closure
which is based on preferential attachment theory. Topirceanu et al. (2018) proposes Weighted
Betweenness Preferential Attachment (WBPA) model that incorporates the concepts of degree
saturation, link weight evolution and dynamic community formation to explain the dynamics of social
networks. Lou et al. (2019) use preferential attachment to create an agent-based model of information
spreading by social bots.
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2.3

Network Interventions and Diffusion of Innovations Theory

Valente (2012) argues that network interventions’ goal is to “use social networks or social network data
to generate social influence, accelerate behavior change, improve performance, and/or achieve desirable
outcomes among individuals, communities, organizations, or populations.” Aral (2012) recommends the
application of network interventions in a social media context in order to contain negative user behaviors
on social media outlets or to support positive behaviors among social media users. Lazer et al. (2018)
define two types of interventions that one can use to target fake news propagation. First, Lazer et al.
(2018) propose changes in the structure of the social network to prevent a user from being exposed to
fake news. Second, Lazer et al. (2018) propose interventions which help users to critically evaluate the
news on social media in terms of their authenticity.
Network interventions on social media have been successfully introduced in altering the
behavior of individuals. For example, Harris et al. (2014) propose node removal in the Twitter network
to address malicious consequences of astroturfing as a part of network interventions strategy. Monsted et
al. (2017) use bots to conduct network interventions experiment on Twitter and propose complex
contagion model. The researchers find that the proposed complex contagion model is more effective in
assessing information diffusion that simple models. On top of that, past research uses network
interventions on social media to influence political participation of users (Ohme et al., 2017), promote
healthy behaviors (Hunter et al., 2019, Naslund et al., 2017) or prevent diseases (Tso et al., 2016).
2.4

Bot Account Characteristics

Past research related to the existence of malicious accounts on the Twitter network is very diverse. For
example, significant attention in past publications focuses on the explanation of how fake content is
populated within the Twitter network (Gupta et al., 2013) or how bots amplify messages on social media
(Savage et al., 2016, Vosoughi et al., 2018, Mønsted et al., 2017, Salge & Karahanna, 2018). Also, many
studies identify and describe the types of bot accounts, which influence the Twitter network (Ferrara et
al., 2016, Forelle et al., 2017) and investigate ethical issues related to bot behavior (Salge & Berente,
11

2017). Multiple studies focus on the investigation of common features of malicious accounts. For
example, Chu et al. (2012) find that bot-generated tweets often contain spam and show regular posting
patterns as opposed to human-generated tweets, which exhibit more complex timing behaviors.
Significant portions of these studies focus on effective ways to detect malicious accounts on Twitter. For
example, Cao et al. (2014) propose cluster analysis to detect large groups of malicious users. Alarifi et
al. (2016) generate a classifier that uses machine learning techniques to detect sybils (machinecontrolled accounts). Cresci et al. (2015) use existing fake account detection methods as a baseline to
deploy crawling cost analysis and design for the most optimal fake account classifiers. Miller et al.
(2012) define algorithms that cluster legitimate Twitter users and treat outliers as fake accounts, whereas
Cao et al. (2012) deploy social graphs to establish perceived likelihood for an account being a fake
(sybil) account.
Previous research estimated that bot accounts represent from about 5 to 15 % of all Twitter
accounts: 9 -15 % (Varol et al., 2017), 5-8.5% (Twitter, 2014), 15% (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016) of all
accounts registered on Twitter. Bots try to mimic human tasks via Twitter API (Chu et al., 2012).
Legitimate bots are usually used to disseminate large amounts of news-related tweets about traffic,
weather, politics, business or entertainment (Chu et al., 2012, Lokot & Diakopoulos, 2016) and
aggregate news from different outlets (Lokot & Diakopoulos, 2016) whereas malicious deployment of
social bots emulates fake political support or is used to disseminate rumors or spam (Varol et al., 2017,
Chu et al., 2012). On top of that, Lokot & Diakopoulos (2016) identify commentary news bots, whose
role is to present news and provide automated commentary (critique or opinion) on the raised issue.
Social bots, also referred to as sybil accounts, are known to algorithmically generate news
content, interact with other user accounts or coordinate online activities (Davis et al., 2016, Varol et al.,
2017). Social bots grouped together create botnets, which are used in coordinated activities (e.g., bot
attacks, advertisement campaigns) run by botmasters (Varol et al. 2017). The presence of botnets can be
indicated by the increased level of spamming activity as accounts owned by humans would rarely be
used to retweet spam tweets (Cook et al., 2014). Abokhodair et al. (2015) describe misdirection and
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smoke screening as two types of tactics bots can potentially employ to point the Twitter audience away
from legitimate and truthful information. Botnet campaigns are often targeted to populate content, which
is unrelated to the discussed topic, and by this they try to refocus a reader away from legitimate news.
Freitas et al. (2015) propose two categories of social bots: (1) High Activity, who generate content every
1-60 minutes and (2) Low Activity, whose role is to generate content every 1-120 minutes. Socialbot
Networks (SbN) consist of bot accounts controlled by a botherder – a person whose role is to govern a
network of bots for two reasons: (1) undertake infiltration activities on a given social network and (2)
collect user data from a given social network (Boshmaf et al., 2011).
Spam bots randomly follow users and expect that some users will follow bots back (Chu et al.,
2012). By this, spam posts with email spam which lead to ad-infested intermediary sites (Lokot &
Diakopoulos, 2016) or unsolicited commercial information populated by bot accounts get disseminated
across the network. Chu et al. (2012) estimate that among all bot accounts, about 60% of such accounts
would have fewer followers than followees.
Stringhini et al. (2010) propose a four distinct bot categories, out of which two can be found on
Twitter. The first category of bots, called ‘Bragger’, posts spam tweets on their own Twitter page, which
are then visible on the followers’ feeds (only followers and not their contacts can see such spam tweets).
The second category, ‘Whisperer’ sends direct spam messages to users, without posting the content on
the Twitter webpage.
Chu et al. (2012) define a set of characteristics, which is typical for bot accounts:
-

Bots usually populate content which lacks originality or is not intelligent,

-

Tweeting process of bots is excessively automated,

-

Spam or malicious URLs (e.g., phishing or malware links) are usually present in tweets posted
by bot accounts,

-

Bots tend to publish duplicated tweets in a repetitive manner,
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-

Bots employ a tactic of aggressive following of other accounts. They tend to follow human users
whom they chose either randomly or purposefully, on a mass scale. If a user does not follow
bots back, bots would unfollow such users and follow a set of other user-owned accounts.
Varol et al. (2017) identify two types of bots: simple and sophisticated. Sophisticated bots,

which try to build normal-looking social ties with other accounts, are known to retweet humans but at
the same time they are not likely to mention human-generated content. Also, sophisticated bots would
not be able to lead meaningful discussion exchanges with humans. In turn, simple bots tend to follow
other accounts in a random manner, retweet other simple bots and mention sophisticated bots and
interact with other bots, which show human-like behavior (Varol et al., 2017).
Abokhodair et al. (2015) define five types of bots (peripheral bots, core bots and their subtypes:
short-lived bots, long-lived bots and generator bots) based on the conducted study.
-

Core bots - tweet on average every six minutes, more than 1600 tweets every week. The longer
bots stay active, tweeting frequency tends to increase week by week (e.g., the researchers
observed that some core bots would reach almost 6000 tweets/ week in the 28th week of
tweeting). 50% of the content populated by core bots is related to retweeting activities – core
bots would retweet content generated by other bots,

-

Long-lived bots can operate undetected between 1 to 32 weeks whereas short-lived bots would
survive less than six weeks on the Twitter network and then get suspended,

-

Generator bots – create their own tweets (up to 2100/ week) instead of retweeting tweets that
come from other sources. Tweets created by generator bots are retweeted by core bots,

-

Peripheral bots – usually would not tweet more than two tweets generated by core bots. They
mimic human behavior on Twitter and post fewer than 70 tweets/ week
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Table 1 Selected Literature on Bot Types’ Classification

Year

Author

Identified bot types

2017

Varol et al.

Simple bots, sophisticated bots

2015

Freitas et al.

High Activity bots, Low Activity bots

2015

Abokhodair et al.

Peripheral bots, core bots, short-lived bots, long-lived bots, generator
bots

2011

Lee et al.

Duplicate Spammers, Duplicate @ Spammers, Malicious Promoters,
Friend Infiltrators

2010

Stringhini et al.

Bragger, Whisperer

Lee et al. (2011) define four types of content polluters, which they define as “unwanted
disruptive entities,” whose role is to aggressively promote illegitimate content. The first type of
polluters, called ‘Duplicate Spammers,’ post duplicate tweets, which sometimes might contain URLs
across the network. The second group, ‘Duplicate @ Spammers,’ act in similar way as the first group
and on top of that they abusively mention legitimate users in their tweets using the @username
mechanism. By doing this, they increase the visibility of their tweets to users who do not follow
spammer accounts. ‘Malicious promoters’ are the third group, whose role is to disseminate information
about business, marketing or finance. They usually have a large number of followers because along with
promotion of fake or illegitimate content, they also post legitimate tweets. The last defined group,
‘Friend Infiltrators’ resemble legitimate account features and increase follower counts by randomly
following user accounts. Once ‘Friend Infiltrators’ reach a large set of followers, they start populating
spam content across their followers’ network. Lee et al. (2011) argue that content polluters post on
average 4 tweets a day to mimic the behavior of legitimate users. However, the feature which makes
them different from legitimate user accounts is the large and even number of followers, and followees,
which can reach over 30000 accounts that follow or are followed by content polluter accounts.
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2.5

Human Account Characteristics

Human-owned accounts are more likely to interact with other accounts that are owned by humans, rather
than accounts indicating bot ownership (Varol et al., 2017). Human accounts are usually followed by
other human-owned accounts and sophisticated bots (Varol et al., 2017). Reciprocation of the followeefollower relationship is higher between human-owned accounts than bot-like accounts (Varol et al.,
2017) and usually for human-owned accounts the ratio of followee-follower is close to one (Chu et al.,
2012). Human-owned accounts are likely to follow bot accounts, which generate news content and
would usually retweet bot-generated content (e.g., news content generated by bot accounts), but at the
same time they would not be mentioning bot-accounts in their tweets (Varol et al., 2017).
Table 2 Selected Literature on Human Accounts Classification

Year

Author

Identified human user types

2014

Varol et al.

Influential users, information consumers

2012

Tinati et al.

Idea Starters, Amplifiers, Curators, Commentators, Viewers

2008

Krishnamurthy et al.

Broadcasters, Acquaintances, Miscreants, Evangelists

Krishnamurthy et al. (2008) define the following types of human-owned accounts:
-

Broadcasters – the number of followers of broadcasters’ accounts exceeds the number of
broadcasters’ followees. Such accounts are run by media outlets such as newspapers or radio
stations. Chu et al. (2012) add celebrity-owned accounts, which could be defined by
broadcasters’ category;

-

Acquaintances, whose number of followees and followers is usually similar;

-

Miscreants represented by spammers or stalkers;

-

Evangelists, who reach out to other users with a hope to collect new followers
Tinati et al. (2012) provide characteristics of five categories of human behavior on Twitter,

which then they model in a network:
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-

Idea Starters – their network of connections is usually limited but because of the quality of the
connections, their tweets are retweeted in high numbers. They can be identified as influential
individuals, who have their community interested in what Idea Starters publish

-

Amplifiers – they usually share other users’ ideas; therefore, they are likely to retweet other
peoples’ tweets, rather than publish their own tweets

-

Curators – would be identified as users who typically retweet information published by Idea
Starters. Within the user network, they would serve as aggregators of tweets published within a
network

-

Commentators – do not seek to boost their status on the network or retweet content for selfbenefit. They usually present their opinions but do not get involved intensely in online
conversations. Tinati et al. (2012) model their behavior as active retweeters.

-

Viewers – passively observe conversations on Twitter. They usually do not tweet nor post
retweets.
Varol et al. (2014) distinguish between influential users and information consumers. Influential

users whose tweets are popular and receive high numbers of retweets are further divided into two user
group types. Group 1 has more followers than followees, whereas Group 2 (hidden influential) have
more followees than followers. Information consumers, who usually retweet others’ tweets, are divided
into 2 subgroups: rebroadcasters, who have large numbers of followers and Group 2 – common users.
Echeverria & ZhouGao (2017) argue that the tweeting behavior of a random user follows a
power-law distribution. On average, 43% of Twitter users have never tweeted in their lifetime and of the
rest 30% of Twitter users have posted more than three tweets. Also, Echeverria & ZhouGao (2017)
estimate that large numbers of tweets are posted by small numbers of users.
Xu & Yang (2012) provide the following characteristics of an “ordinary” human-owned user
account: (a) it usually has 100 – 3000 followers and followees, (b) the account could be listed on Twitter
1 – 50 times and (c) most active legitimate Twitter users tweet 10 – 200 times a week.
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2.6

Cyborg Account Characteristics

An amalgamation of human and bot accounts is referred to as bot-assisted humans or human-assisted
bots (Chu et al., 2012). Their role is to conduct automated action supervised by humans, which are used
to populate terrorist propaganda (Varol et al., 2017). Cyborgs can perform pre-programmed human
actions using blog widgets or RSS feeds without direct human supervision (Chu et al., 2012). Chu et al.
(2012) argue that the number of tweets published by cyborgs is higher than the number populated by
bots or humans. Retweets done by cyborgs are usually harder to detect than botnet retweets (Cook et al.,
2014). Cyborgs tend to send personalized-looking messages on top of automatic tweets at a different
frequency. On the contrary, every bot within a defined botnet tweets exactly the same content (Cook et
al., 2014).
2.7

Tweeting Behavior of Bots, Humans and Cyborgs

Twitter communities typically form around celebrities, popular individuals or media companies (Gruzd
et al., 2011). Marwick & Boyd (2011) argue that legitimate human users with low numbers of followers
who do not use Twitter to promote themselves usually perceive Twitter as a personal area in which
marketing activities or spamming is not desired. Such users typically create tweets which are inspired by
the context of tweets such users follow. What is more, Xu & Yang (2012) argue that human users are
more likely to retweet the content generated by followees’ accounts if they retweeted the content
published by the same followees’ accounts in the past. Twitter users tend to socialize either by
establishing pairwise connection or by following the same groups of interests (Aiello et al., 2012).
Following the definition of Marwick & Boyd (2011), legitimate users, in order to keep their accounts
authentic looking, employ two techniques: self-censorship (users refuse to comment or tweet on specific
topics, which they don’t feel comfortable to elaborate on) or balance (users balance publishing personal
information when discussing informative subjects).
Chu et. al (2012) analyze weekly Twitter users’ behavior and indicate that the highest tweeting
activity of humans is Monday to Friday during the daytime with far fewer tweets being posted over
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weekends. On the contrary, bots tend to tweet seven days a week with no slow-downs in tweeting
behavior on Saturday or Sunday or during nights. The researchers argue that cyborgs tend to be most
active on Mondays with the lowest activity levels noted on Saturdays. Chu et al. (2012) argue that over
50% of tweets generated by humans are posted manually on the Twitter network followed by mobile
applications and desktop clients.
Bessi & Ferrara (2016) argue that bots, as opposed to legitimate human account holders, tend to
tweet in much larger bursts than humans. They tend to retweet existing content more often than creating
their own tweets. What is more, they usually have more followees than followers, and a short lifespan
(after being created they usually get quickly suspended or removed) and their user names are randomly
generated. In turn, Chu et al. (2012) argue that bots can become dormant or hibernated. In such time they
would not be disseminating any tweets. However, during the time when bots are active, the number of
tweets generated by bots is higher than the number generated by humans. Chu et al.(2012) also argue
that unlike bots, humans do not fall into a pattern of intense tweeting behavior and their tweeting
behavior shows irregularities (human tweeting patterns have larger standard deviation of tweet
interarrivals than bots). Humans tend to tweet in hourly or daily interarrivals, which are much greater
than average interarrivals generated by bot accounts. What is more, bots tend to tweet at fixed
interarrivals, no matter of existing circumstances whereas human-owned accounts are likely to tweet in
higher volumes if an exogenous circumstance (e.g., political event) occurs (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016).
Stringhini et al. (2010) define two types of behavior (greedy and stealthy), which can
characterize bots. All of the greedy bots’ tweets contain spam content. Thus, it’s easy to detect, flag or
unfollow such bots. In turn, stealthy bots’ messages look legitimate but often contain malicious content.
Therefore, they are more difficult to identify. Stringhini et al. (2010) analyze 534 spam bots in their
dataset, out of which 416 are identified as greedy and 98 as stealthy. In turn, Echeverria & ZhouGao
(2017) describe low profile bots, which are in a position to survive undetected for years in a Twitter
network. The researchers argue that low profile bots usually tweet only a few times in their lifetime.
They have low number of followers and the content of their tweets resembles real language, which lets
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them avoid automatic detection of machine-created language. Many of such bots have legitimate user
profiles and some of them would also have Twitter profile pictures (by this they avoid being detected
based on analysis of account profiles). Low profile bots do not attach URLs to their tweets nor do they
mention @usernames in their replies to other tweets.
Bessi & Ferrara (2016) analyze bot behavior and characterize it as follows. Bots tend to search
through Twitter or Google network for keywords/ hashtags of their interest. As a next step they
automatically repost articles or retweet found content through bot-owned profiles. Also, they tend to
automatically reply to tweets or follow users, who tweet with keywords/ hashtags which are of interest
for bots. Moreover, if a legitimate user follows a bot, that bot would usually automatically follow such
user back.
Bots tend to use unregistered API-based tools, which allow them to automatically post tweets on
Twitter (Chu et al., 2012). Chu et al. (2012) estimate that over 40% of bot-generated tweets are
published in such a way. Cyborgs emulate posting techniques of humans and bots and can post their
tweets either manually or automatically. Finally, account characteristics such as default background
profile settings, no pictures, or very few details populated on the account can be a good indication for an
account to be a bot account (Cook et al., 2014).
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CHAPTER 3. IMPLICATIONS OF MALICIOUS ACCOUNTS REMOVAL ON TWITTER1
This chapter investigates how the removal of malicious followers of influential celebrity and politician
social media accounts impacts the popularity of tweets posted by such accounts. First, the study
highlights previous research related to the analysis of malicious accounts on Twitter. Second, the study
discusses to what extent malicious accounts contribute to the amplification of tweets over the network.
Third, the study presents methods used to conduct the analysis and discusses the findings. Finally, the
study discusses the implications.
A major challenge introduced by malicious accounts on social media is the potential for false
impressions that such accounts generate or amplify. Malicious accounts are usually driven by bots,
automated programs that spread malicious content, propagate false information or exert influence on
social media users (Ferrara et. al, 2016, Stringhini et al., 2015, Cao et al., 2016). Bots are used to
propagate malware, spam or illegitimate links (Alarifi et al., 2016); they can also contribute to attempts
at polarizing political discussions or even influencing elections (Ferrara et al., 2016) by inflating
trending topics related to a given political candidate.
Among the biggest challenges related to the governance of social media outlets is developing
policies that minimize the impact of malicious accounts (Lapowsky, 2018). Social media companies
have been actively pursuing malicious accounts, with the goal of reducing their overall number as well
as the impact of such accounts’ bad actions. For example, before the US midterm elections in November
2018, Facebook and Instagram blocked accounts showing “coordinated inauthentic behavior” that
seemed designed to interfere in the elections’ outcome (Gleicher, 2018). In November 2017, Twitter

1

Portions of this chapter have been previously published in the Proceedings of the European Conference on
Information Systems (ECIS 2019) and have been reproduced with permission from the Association of Information
Systems

21

(2017) updated the Automation Rules Policy prohibiting scripting the Twitter website to generate spam
or otherwise bother Twitter users. At the same time, Twitter publicly communicated that automated
tweets that seek to manipulate trending topics would be filtered out and any originating accounts would
be suspended. Consequently, to protect Twitter users from manipulation and abuse, the company
decided to remove roughly 70 million suspicious accounts from the network in June and July 2018
(Timberg & Dwoskin, 2018). Targeted accounts had been actively used to propagate and amplify news
of questionable provenance (Fung, 2018). Twitter reported that as a result of the cleanup, some Twitter
accounts owned by politicians (e.g., Barack Obama or Donald Trump) or celebrities (such as Katy Perry,
Justin Bieber, Oprah Winfrey or Ellen DeGeneres) lost significant numbers of followers (Fung, 2018,
Moore, 2018).
The study’s primary motivation is to understand how the removal of malicious accounts that
follow influential people impacts the popularity of tweets posted by such celebrities and politicians.
First, the study investigates to what extent malicious accounts contribute to the amplification of tweets
over the network. Then, it analyzes the propagation of Donald Trump’s tweets before and after
malicious accounts were cleaned up in June and July 2018. To establish whether the suspension
activities that Twitter undertook have any impact on the number of (1) retweets and (2) favorites, we
apply a sign paired t-test. The study established that there is a statistically significant difference in the
daily mean count of retweets and favorites before and after the malicious accounts’ cleanup. Second, the
study analyzed the lifespan of Donald Trump’s tweets to better understand the nature and characteristics
of propagation over time. To do that, the study focuses on Trump’s tweets published in November 1-13,
2018 as we expect a higher user responsiveness given Midterm elections which took place on November
6. To understand the types of tweets generated by Donald Trump, the study categorizes his tweets
(Rocket Ship, Blimp or other categories), depending on the total number of retweets. The study
primarily focuses on retweets as previous research has proven that retweets are more effective than
favorites in estimating informativeness of a tweet (Kwak et al., 2011). To assess the effectiveness of
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Twitter’s current malicious account cleanup attempts based on the Automation Rules, the study
extracted a tweet dataset and analyzed the descriptive statistics.
The core factor, which motivates this study to focus on Donald Trump’s account, is firstly
related to the interest his tweets generate. Secondly, a Gallup study published in May 2018 indicated that
out of the 52 million accounts following Trump’s Twitter account, 29% are likely to be fake (Dodds,
2018), which further motivates us to investigate the problem. Lastly, the analysis presented in this study
is prompted in part by Donald Trump’s complaint related to the cleanup of bot accounts and overall
reduction in the number of his followers, which he shared on Twitter in October 2018: "A few weeks
ago it was a Rocket Ship, now it is a Blimp! Total Bias?" (Trump, 2018).
3.1

Background

Past research related to the existence of malicious or bot accounts on the Twitter networks is quite
diverse. For example, significant attention in past publications is dedicated to the explanation of how
fake content is populated within the Twitter network (Gupta et al., 2013) or how bots are used to amplify
messages on social media (Savage et al., 2016, Vosoughi et al., 2018, Mønsted et al., 2017, Salge &
Karahanna, 2018). Also, many studies identify and describe the types of bot accounts, which influence
the Twitter network (Ferrara et al., 2016, Forelle et al., 2017). Ethical issues related to bot behavior have
also been investigated (Salge & Berente, 2017).
Multiple studies focus on the investigation of common features of malicious accounts. For
example, Chu et al. (2012) argue that bot-generated tweets often contain spam and show regular posting
patterns as opposed to human-generated tweets, which exhibit more complex timing behaviors.
Significant portions of these studies focus on effective ways to detect malicious accounts on Twitter. For
example, Cao et al. (2014) propose cluster analysis to detect large groups of malicious users. Alarifi et
al. (2016) generate a classifier that uses machine learning techniques to detect “Sybils” (machinecontrolled accounts). Cresci et al. (2015) use existing fake account detection methods as a baseline to
deploy crawling cost analysis and design for the most optimal fake account classifiers. Miller et al.
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(2012) define algorithms that cluster legitimate Twitter users and treat outliers as fake accounts, whereas
Cao et al. (2012) deploy social graphs to establish perceived likelihood for an account being a fake
(Sybil) account. To our knowledge the research about the extent to which the suspension of malicious
accounts impacts message propagation on social media networks has not been widely investigated in the
past.
3.2

Method and Testbed

To understand how the suspension of malicious accounts impacts the propagation of messages on
Twitter, in the first part of the study we analyze retweets of 323 Donald Trump tweets collected between
June 15 and July 30, 2018. This is followed by a sign paired t-test, which helps us to establish whether
the difference of means of daily retweets and favorites collected before and after malicious accounts’
suspension was statistically significant.
The study presents data whose collection starts 12 days before the first malicious account
cleanup and finishes 12 days after the last cleanup was concluded. As reported by Jacobs (2018), Donald
Trump’s account lost a total of over 300,000 followers in three cleanup attempts conducted on June 27,
July 12 and July 18. During this time span, the most popular tweet was posted on July 8, got retweeted
114,596 times, received 319,173 favorites and contained the following text: “They just didn't get it but
they do now!” accompanied by a 2:29 min movie. The least popular tweet was published with text “The
legendary Gary Player at Turnberry in Scotland!” on June 26 and received 4,883 retweets and 33,218
favorites. These two tweets are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Donald Trump’s Most Popular Tweet (Left) vs. Least Popular Tweet (Right)

The study uses an online archive2 to extract a subset of Trump’s tweets during the timespan of
interest, followed by the number of retweets each tweet received. Simultaneously, the study collects the
data indicating the number of Donald Trump’s account followers using snapshots of daily changes in
Twitter account followers via https://web.archive.org.
In the second part the study takes a daily snapshot of 141 tweets posted by Donald Trump
between November 1 and 13, 2018 (around US midterm elections) to understand the dynamics of daily
changes in the retweets associated with tweets by Donald Trump. The study follows each of the 141
tweets’ retweet counts for seven days. Since we observe that the retweet count plateaued after the fourth
day of the tweets being posted, we implement a 4-day cutoff. The most popular tweet from the timespan
was posted on November 2, containing a graphical image with the text “Sanctions are coming November
5,” and received 65,869 retweets and 199,616 favorites by the fourth day after the tweet had been
published. The least popular tweet, which Donald Trump posted around the time of the midterm
elections, was published on November 1 with the following content: “....His opponent Jared Polis is
weak on crime and weak on borders – could never do the job. Get out and VOTE – Walker has my
Complete and Total Endorsement!” and received 8,478 retweets and 35,015 favorites after the four days.
The descriptive statistics for the dataset are presented in Table 3, broken out by time periods.

2

http://trumptwitterarchive.com/archive
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Table 3 Retweets’ Descriptive Statistics

June 15 - July 30, 2018 November 1 - 13, 2018
Retweet count

323

141

Max retweet count 114596

65869

Min retweet count

4883

8478

Mean

21322

20779

Standard deviation 11089

10269

Median

18255

3.3

20197

Results
The initial analysis of the dataset shows that the cleanup of Trump’s Twitter account took place

on June 27 (around 100,000 followers were removed), July 12 (around 200,000 followers were
removed) and July 18 (around 100,000 were removed).
As a next step, the study analyzes the counts of retweets obtained for tweets published between
June 15 and July 30, 2018. To better understand the trend, the study computes the daily average for all
tweets published on a given day. The observation showcases that one day after each of the three cleanup
events takes place, the mean retweet count is significantly lower than earlier. We perform a sign pair ttest to establish whether the difference in the mean count of retweets before and after the cleanup is
statistically significant. The observation shows that there is a statistically significant difference between
the retweet counts before and after the cleanup. The study also conducts a similar test on mean favorite
count for the same dataset capturing Trump’s tweets. The study showcases that there is a statistically
significant difference between the mean favorite counts before and after the cleanup as well. We
showcase the results of both tests in Table 4.
Table 4 Results of a Sign Pair T-test

t-statistic

p-value

Mean of the
differences

Retweet count

0.60088

0.5542

955,59

Favorite (like) count

0.95693

0.349

4766,65
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However, since the raw time series is very volatile, the next course of action is to apply a smoothing
technique based on moving averages. The study computes two simple moving averages (one short and
one long) to capture possible trends. Figure 3 shows a comparison between the 3-day and 10-day
moving averages for retweet tallies. There are roughly six crossing points, where the shorter moving
average crosses the longer 10-day moving average, creating seven different episodes (3 breaks to the
upside, 4 to the downside). This simple technique does show that Twitter behavior (at least for Donald
Trump) tends to be episodic in nature.

Figure 3 Followers Tally (Left); Retweet 3-day/ 10-day Moving Average (Right)

3.4

Categorizing Donald Trump’s Tweets
To categorize the tweets according to the number of retweets they received, the study focuses on

two aspects: 1) the total amount of retweets a certain tweet garners and 2) the number of retweets the
tweet gathers on a day-to-day basis. The initial descriptive statistics show a highly skewed distribution
for retweets. Therefore, the study applies a log transformation is performed to help us create reasonable
categories. This allows to identify three broad categories of tweets (“Rocket Ships”, “Jets” and
“Blimps”) to get a better understanding of the retweet behavior as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 Tale of 141 Donald Trump’s Tweets (November 1-13, 2018)

Following Donald Trump’s lead (see the example tweet above), tweets at the high end of the
distribution are labeled “Rocket Ships” and the low end “Blimps” (with “Jets” for now making up the
middle ground).
Rocket Ships: Tweets that reached 30,000 retweets or above (marked by a red line in Figure 4).
Jets: Tweets represent the middle ground for now (marked by a yellow line on Figure 4).
Blimps: Tweets with less 10,000 retweets (marked by a blue line on Figure 4).
Out of 141 tweets posted by Donald Trump between November 1 and 13 2018, 11 (8%) are categorized
as Blimps, 113 (80%) are categorized as Jets and 17 (12%) as Rocket Ships.

Figure 5 Retweets Categorization (June-July vs. November 2018)

The study computes similar descriptive statistics for a set of 323 of Donald Trump’s tweets
which we collected between June 15 and July 30, 2018. As shown in Figure 5, the distribution of tweet
categories is similar to the distribution recorded for the tweets collected in November. When comparing
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percentage values before and after malicious accounts cleanup, Rockets Ship category change its value
from 15% to 13%, Blimp category go from 7% to 8%, whereas Jet change their percentage value from
78% to 79%.
3.5

Discussion

The results of the analysis show that the implications of Twitter’s cleanup initiatives, which targeted
malicious accounts, are visible in the narrowing amplitudes of retweet values. The least popular tweet in
June-July 2018 (when Twitter cleanup initiatives were conducted) reached 4,883 retweets (on June 26 –
before the first cleanup), whereas the most popular tweet in the indicated time was retweeted 114,596
times (the tweet was posted on July 8 – 16 days after the first cleanup and 4 days before the second
cleanup). In contrast, tweets published by Donald Trump around the US midterm elections received
8,478 retweets (least popular tweet posted on November 1) and 65,869 retweets (most popular tweet
posted on November 2). However, the distribution of tweet categories based on the number of retweets
remained unchanged during US midterm elections in November 2018, as compared to retweets of tweets
published in June and July 2018.
The contributions of this study are as follows. First, the study assembles a dataset of Donald
Trump’s tweets, which we plan to make available in the future. Secondly, the analysis shows that when
it comes to a lifespan of individual tweets posted by Donald Trump, the retweet count stabilizes after the
fourth day. What is more, the investigation shows that Twitter behavior (at least for Donald Trump)
tends to be episodic in nature. The study then organizes tweets into three categories (Rocket Ships, Jets
and Blimps) and investigates how the structure of tweets’ distribution is influenced by a cleanup of
malicious accounts. Finally, the study forms more fine-grained categories (‘Rocket Ships’, ‘Jets’ and
‘Blimps’) based on a log transformation of the retweet amplitude. Overall, the analysis shows that the
distribution of tweet categories, before and after malicious accounts’ cleanup, does not change
significantly. However, there is clearly a narrowing in the amplitude of retweets and favorites (as
described above), which is backed by a sign paired t-test that found a statistically significant difference
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in the mean count of retweets and favorites before and after the cleanup. This makes intuitive sense if
the Twitter account removals reduced the number of bots (serving as amplifiers), as well as somewhat
inactive accounts at the other end of the spectrum, thereby narrowing the retweet range.
This chapter serves as a first step towards a comprehensive and scientifically sound
investigation presented in this dissertation on the implications of malicious account actions on social
media outlets. Manipulation initiatives on social media instigated by malicious accounts have an
overwhelming negative effect on societies, cause confusion and distrust and are often used to deepen
societal divisions based on nationalistic, racial or religious strains (Ferrara, 2015, Wardle & Derakhshan,
2017). The extension of this work develops a simulation framework using agent-based modeling
presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Such a framework is especially useful in gaining a better
understanding of social media network dynamics and help implement and evaluate future policies on
such platforms. An agent-based model of the Twitter environment presented in Chapter 5 contributes to
the understanding of the impacts of malicious accounts on tweet propagation. What is more, in Chapter 6
evaluates how a hypothetical Twitter policy-based intervention impacts tweet propagation on social
media platforms.
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CHAPTER 4. UNDERSTANDING MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR ON TWITTER3
This chapter focuses on the investigation of malicious account behaviors that Twitter tagged as
malicious and removed from the network. First, the study presents past research that characterizes
malicious account behavior on Twitter followed by the discussion on past research on Twitter account
features. Second, it reviews past research that deployed clustering techniques to investigate
characteristics of the Twitter network. Third, it presents the data source and the methods of data
analysis. Next, it presents the results of the analysis and discusses the findings. Finally, the study
elaborates on implications and discusses conclusions.
Over the past years social media has become an important medium for public life (Bradshaw
and Howard, 2017) and a platform where people are encouraged to share their views (Kelly et al., 2012)
or opinions (Jameel et al., 2019, Bovet et al., 2018). At the same time, the emergence of activities
instigated by malicious accounts has challenged the foundations of today’s information society (Ferrara,
2015). Manipulation initiatives have an overwhelming negative effect on societies (Ferrara, 2015)
whereas disinformation campaigns embrace confusion and sow distrust; they are often used to deepen
societal divisions based on nationalistic, racial or religious strains (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). It has
been reported that in the past malicious actors’ actions on social media focused on diverting attention
from discussed issues (Bradshaw and Howard, 2017), influencing beliefs and values of social media
users (Gorwa, 2017), providing fake political support (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011) or manipulating online
discussions on presidential elections (Bessi and Ferrara, 2016). Most recent studies have shown that bots

3

Portions of this chapter have been previously published in the Proceedings of the Americas’ Conference on
Information Systems (AMCIS 2019) and have been reproduced with permission from the Association of
Information Systems
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and trolls can also be used to promote malicious health content and spread antivaccine messages
(Broniatowski et al., 2019).
The first organized attempts to manipulate social media were reported in 2010 (Bradshaw and
Howard, 2017). As of 2017, organizations that attempted to manipulate social media outlets were found
in 28 countries. Activities that showcased nudging of public opinion were reported both among countries
with democratic governments and authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, social media campaigns were
found to target both local populations and global audience, aiming at foreign countries (Bradshaw and
Howard, 2017). Recently it has been estimated that only one percent of social media users are
responsible for generating 80 percent of fake news, whereas 80 percent of the fake news content is
populated by 0.1 percent of the social media population (Grinberg et al., 2019).
Social media companies and researchers have been actively targeting malicious accounts to minimize
the impact of their actions. In the past, researchers have focused on ways to make social networks
resilient during cyber-attacks (Thakur et al., 2019, Li et al., 2019). In addition, privacy violation
measures were incorporated to protect social networks from active attacks (DasGupta et al., 2019).
Social media companies have focused on blocking accounts that show “coordinated inauthentic
behavior” that seem designed to interfere in elections’ outcomes (Gleicher, 2018). What is more, in
November 2017, Twitter (2017) updated its Automation Rules Policy. The company publicly
communicated that automated tweets seeking to manipulate trending topics would be filtered out and
any originating accounts would be suspended. Consequently, in October 2018, Twitter created a data
archive “to strengthen Twitter against attempted manipulation, including malicious automated accounts
and spam” (Twitter, 2018). The published data archives that were posted on Twitter present removed
malicious accounts and their tweets and other media (such as images or videos) related to malicious
operations originating in Spain (Catalonia), Russia, Venezuela and Iran.
The primary motivation of this study is to understand and compare the characteristics of
malicious account behaviors on Twitter based on the analysis of the published data archive originating in
Spain (Catalonia), Russia, Venezuela and Iran. The study investigates and compares emergent behavior
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of accounts that Twitter identified as malicious and removed from the Twitter network. We focus on the
analysis of six types of malicious accounts’ features: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting
frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account activity score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet
count. With the use of descriptive statistics and unsupervised learning, the study extends past research
that defined behavioral patterns of malicious actors on Twitter. The research presented in this chapter
contributes to the understanding of behavior of malicious actors and enriches current research in that
area. The study analyzes four datasets published by Twitter in January 2019, which contain details on
suspended malicious accounts’ activities initiated in Spain (Catalonia), Russia, Venezuela and Iran.
4.1
4.1.1

Background
Accounts’ Behavior Classification

Past literature provides valuable information on the classification of both legitimate and malicious actors
on social media platforms based on the actors’ behaviors. Table 5 summarizes the literature on
classification of Twitter accounts. For example, Varol et al. (2017) provide a distinction between (1)
simple bots, which are likely to retweet other simple bots and (2) sophisticated bots, which usually
retweet human accounts. Freitas et al. (2015) define (1) high activity bots, which tweet between one and
60 minutes and (2) low activity bots, which generate tweets between one and 120 minutes. Abokhodair
et al. (2015) define five types of bots: peripheral bots followed by core bots and their subtypes: shortlived bots, long-lived bots and generator bots. Varol et al. (2014) provide a distinction between
influential users and information consumers. Influential users’ tweets are usually popular and receive
high numbers of retweets whereas information consumers usually retweet others’ tweets. Tinati et al.
(2012) provide characteristics of five categories of human behavior on Twitter and grouped the users
into the following categories: idea starters, amplifiers, curators, commentators and viewers.
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Table 5 Selected Literature on Twitter Account Classification

Year

Author

Identified Twitter Account Types

2017

Varol et al.

‘Simple bots,’ ‘sophisticated bots’

2015

Freitas et al.

‘High activity bots,’ ‘low activity bots’

2015

Abokhodair et

‘Peripheral bots,’ ‘core bots,’ ‘short-lived bots,’ ‘long-lived bots,’

al.

‘generator bots’

2014

Varol et al.

‘Influential users,’ ‘information consumers’

2012

Tinati et al.

‘Idea starters,’ ‘amplifiers,’ ‘curators,’ ‘commentators,’ ‘viewers’

2012

Cha et al.

‘Mass media,’ ‘grassroots,’ ‘evangelists’

2012

Chu et al.

‘Humans,’ ‘bots,’ ‘cyborgs’

2011

Lee et al.

‘Duplicate spammers,’ ‘duplicate @ spammers,’ ‘malicious promoters,’
‘friend infiltrators’

2010

Stringhini et al.

‘Bragger,’ ‘whisperer’

2008

Krishnamurthy

‘Broadcasters,’ ‘acquaintances,’ ‘miscreants,’ ‘evangelists’

et al.

Cha et al. (2012) group Twitter users into three categories: (1) ‘mass media’ accounts that have
a large number of followers but do not follow many accounts themselves, (2) ‘grassroots’ accounts
represented by ordinary users and (3) ‘evangelists’ accounts represented by opinion leaders, celebrities
or politician accounts. Chu et al. (2012), apart from identifying human and bot accounts, also provide a
description of cyborg accounts (bot-assisted humans or human-assisted bots), which are an
amalgamation of human and bot accounts. It is typical for such accounts to show both automated and
manual behavior characteristics. Lee et al. (2011) define four types of content polluters, whose roles are
to aggressively promote illegitimate content: (1) ‘duplicate spammers’ post duplicate tweets that contain
URLs across the network, (2) ‘duplicate @ spammers’ abusively mention legitimate users in their tweets
using the @username mechanism, (3) ‘malicious promoters’ which post fake or illegitimate content
along with legitimate tweets and (4) ‘friend infiltrators’ which resemble legitimate account features and
increase follower counts by randomly following user accounts. Stringhini et al. (2010) identify two
categories of bots. The first category, called ‘bragger,’ posts spam tweets on their own Twitter pages,
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which are then visible on the followers’ feeds (only followers and not their contacts can see such spam
tweets). The second category, ‘whisperer,’ sends direct spam messages to users, without posting the
content on the Twitter webpage. Krishnamurthy et al. (2008) distinguished between the following types
of human-owned accounts: (1) broadcasters run by media outlets such as newspapers or radio stations
whose number of followers exceeds the number of followees, (2) acquaintances, whose number of
followees and followers is usually similar; (3) miscreants represented by spammers or stalkers and (4)
evangelists, who reach out to other users to collect new followers.
4.2

Twitter Account Features – Past Research

Past research defines a variety of Twitter account features which are later used to detect spam and
malicious accounts. For example, Wang et al. (2010) propose and use two types of features to classify
Twitter spam accounts. The first type, graph-based features, are defined by (1) the number of friends, (2)
the number of followers and (3) the reputation of a user defined as the ratio between the number of
friends and the number of followers. Second type of the identified features are content-based and can be
defined as follows: (1) duplicate tweets, (2) HTTP links, (3) replies and mentions and (4) trending
topics. Lee et al. (2012) use URL link features and checked for correlations between them to distinguish
between malicious and legitimate tweets. Cresci et al. (2015) analyze a set of Twitter account features
and found the bidirectional link ratio and the friends/(followers ^ 2) ratio are effective to detect
anomalous Twitter accounts. Vaast et al. (2017) analyze the number of retweets, hashtags and links to
characterize different forms of collective engagement on social media. Yang and Srinivasan (2016)
compare user account Twitter features (number of followers, followings and metadata characteristics) to
analyze the difference between satisfied and dissatisfied Twitter users. Chu et al (2012) propose an
account reputation score to distinguish between human users, cyborgs and bots using the follower/
followee (friend) ratio. In turn, Dickerson et al. (2012) analyze the average number of hashtags, average
number of user mentions, average number of links and average number of special characters to describe
the syntax of user tweets.
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Table 6 Twitter Account Features - Review

Year

Author

Analyzed Twitter Account features

2017

Vaast et al.

the number of retweets, hashtags and links

2016

Yang and

number of followers, followings and metadata characteristics

Srinivasan
2015

Cresci et al.

bidirectional link ratio, friends/(followers ^ 2) ratio

2012

Lee et. al

URL link features

2012

Chu et al.

account reputation (follower_no/(follower_no + friend_no))

2012

Dickerson et

average number of hashtags, average number of user mentions, average

al.

number of links, average number of special characters

Wang et al.

number of friends, the number of followers, the reputation of the user,

2010

duplicate tweets, HTTP links, replies and mentions, trending topics.

4.3

Clustering of Twitter Accounts

Past research often relies on clustering methods to investigate Twitter actors’ characteristics and actions.
For example, Vaast et al. (2017) use clustering to check the consistency of key feature patterns such as
mentions, likes, retweets and hashtags that are used to define connective action episodes (CAEs).
Gunarathne et al. (2018) analyze customer complaints shared through Twitter and deployed the K-means
algorithm to group tweets which share similar complaint types into clusters. Soman and Murugappan
(2014) use the fuzzy K-means (FKM) algorithm to cluster similar user profiles, which share similar
trending topics in their tweets. By this, they propose a method that distinguishes tweet and non-tweet
spam users within similar trending topic areas. Wei et al. (2015) use cluster analysis to distinguish
between suspended and non-suspended accounts. Next, they performed Gaussian Mixture Modeling to
find suspended accounts’ subtypes, such as spammers or bots. Becker et al. (2011) use the online
incremental clustering algorithm to group tweets on similar topics. Then, they use defined cluster to
conduct event classification on Twitter. Kaleel and Abhari (2015) use K-means and LHS techniques to
cluster tweets, label the clusters and identify Twitter events based on the defined clusters. Takhteyev et
al. (2012) cluster tweets based on the geographical location of user accounts’ profiles to find that Twitter
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users tend to establish ties with other users from the same region or metropolitan area. Vosecky et al.
(2014) propose a Multi-faceted Topic Model (MfTM) to evaluate the quality of clustering methods
applied on Twitter datasets. Onuchowska and Berndt (2019) use K-means clustering to analyze the
characteristics of malicious Twitter accounts originating from Bangladesh. Alsaedi et al. (2017) cluster
individual tweets according to an investigated event on Twitter using an online clustering algorithm.
With the clustering output, the researchers are able to summarize topics discussed in each of the
identified clusters. Bakerman et al. (2018) use K-means clustering to analyze tweets’ textual information
combined with the geotagged coordinates information (latitude and longitude) that characterizes each
tweet.
4.4
4.4.1

Methodology
Data Source

In October 2018, Twitter started publishing archives of tweets and media which had been identified as
malicious and removed by Twitter from the network. According to Twitter, identified accounts had been
proliferating information backed by states or commercial entities originating in Russia, Iran, Venezuela
(Twitter, 2018) and Spain (Catalonia) (Roth, 2019). The data archive presented on the Twitter website
contains the information about malicious tweets followed by other media content, such as videos or
pictures.
This study analyzes the datasets related to Iranian and Russian state-backed information
operations, the Catalan independence movement actions and Venezuelan attempts of Twitter platform
manipulations operated by a commercial entity (Roth, 2019). A summary of the characteristics of each
of the analyzed datasets can be found in Table 7.
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Table 7 Twitter Malicious Account Datasets Description

Number of

Description of the dataset (Twitter, 2018; Roth, 2019)

accounts in the
analyzed dataset
Iran

651

Accounts’ actions backed by the Iranian government

Russia

357

Accounts associated with the Russian Internet Research Agency

(IRA)

(IRA)

Spain

75

(Catalonia)

Accounts directly associated with the Catalan independence
movement, specifically Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
deployed to spread content about the Catalan Referendum

Venezuela

478

Accounts operated by a commercial entity from Venezuela used to
manipulate Venezuelan Twitter users

The analyzed datasets were published by Twitter in October 2018 (Iran), January 2019 (Russia,
Venezuela) and June 2019 (Catalonia). Malicious accounts presented in the analyzed datasets contain the
following numerical and categorical attributes (Twitter, 2018).
Numerical attributes characterizing each account are as follows: tweet identification number,
user identification number, the number of accounts following the user, the number of accounts followed
by the user, date of user account creation, the time when the tweet was published, the tweetid of the
original tweet that this tweet is in reply to, the number of tweets quoting this tweet, the number of tweets
replying to this tweet, the number of likes that this tweet received, the number of retweets that this tweet
received
Categorical attributes characterizing each account are as follows: the name of the user (hashed),
the user's self-reported location, the user's profile description, the user's profile URL, the language of the
account, as chosen by the user, the language of the tweet, the text of the tweet, the name of the client app
used to publish the tweet, True/False, is this tweet a retweet, geo-located latitude and longitude, a list of
hashtags used in this tweet, a list of URLs used in this tweet.
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The primary data that this study uses for the analysis involve the following attributes: the
number of accounts following the user (follower count), the number of accounts followed by the user
(following count), date of user account creation (account creation), the time when the tweet was
published, the number of likes that this tweet received and the number of retweets that this tweet
received. Table 8 provides a description of malicious account examples with the lowest and highest
numbers of tweets represented in each of the analyzed country datasets.
Table 8 Description of Malicious Accounts Examples
Reported
Account

location

Spain

Profile description

Follo-

Follo-

wer

wing

count

count

6570

2493

4708

2

0

17

63

265448

46097

8012

1450

1

1

1

19

312489

55007

8685

1451

No.

No. re-

tweets

tweets

2034

Ciberactivistes d'@Esquerra_ERC.

(Catalonia):

Not

Treballant des de la xarxa per una

most active

provided

RepÃºblica Catalana justa!
âœŠðŸ•¼

account
Spain
(Catalonia):

Del

Pastissera de professiÃ³, mare de

least active

maresme

vocaciÃ³.

Nantes,

journaliste indÃ©pendante/un vrai

France

journaliste est un chÃ´meur

Asia

Freelance Photography | CINEMA

account
Iran: most
active
account,
Iran: least
active
account
USA
#IslamIs
TheProb
Russia: most
active
account

em
#WakeU
p

I believe that OUR COUNTRY
needs to BAN ISLAM and
#DeportALLMOSLEMS! Islam is
pure evil! STANDUP,
FIGHTBACK, SPEAKUP TAKE
OUR COUNTRY BACK ..
#INFIDELFORLIFE
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Table 8 (Continued)
Reported
Account

location

Profile description

Follo-

Follo-

wer

wing

count

count

1

104

125

35543

13990

4108

3383

1

1

2

No.

No. re-

tweets

tweets

1

Russia: least
active

USA

Life is too short to wait!

account
All major information policy in the
Venezuela:

Estados

world, we are ready to give you the

most active

Unidos

most accurate and timely information

account

in the field of politics and economics
Compramos tu saldo #Paypal y

Venezuela:

Venezuel

Tarjetas #GiftCard de amazon en

least active

a

BolÃ-vares, Venezuela, pago vÃ-a

account

4.5

0

Banesco

Account Features
For each of the analyzed accounts, the study extracts information about their respective tweeting

history such as tweeting frequency, the number of tweets generated each day, number of days when
accounts stayed dormant and number of days between account creation and account removal. From this
information, we draw characteristics of malicious accounts’ tweeting behavior and we focus on the
measurement of the following features: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age
of account, (4) account activity score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet count. The
description of the identified account features is presented in Table 9.
Table 9 Description of Account Features

Feature

Description

Account reputation

Follower count/ (follower count + following count) (Chu et al., 2012)

Tweet frequency

The average number of tweets generated by an account on a daily basis
(Dickerson et al., 2014)

Days tweeted

Number of days when an account tweeted at least one time

Age of account

Total number of days between account creation and removal (Freitas et
al., 2015)
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Table 9 (Continued)

Feature

Description

Activity score (%)

Days tweeting/ days active (%)

Total number of tweets

Total number of tweets posted during account’s lifetime (Freitas et al.,
2015)

Total like count

Total number of likes all tweets received (De Cristofaro et al., 2014)

Total retweet count

Total number of retweets all tweets received (Cha et al., 2010)

Average like count

Total like count/ total number of tweets

Average retweet count

Total retweet count/ total number of tweets

The description of each feature selected for the clustering analysis is as follows:
1. An account reputation score is calculated by dividing follower count by a sum of following and
follower counts for a given account. A score close to 1 suggests a celebrity account (such accounts have
many followers and few friends). A score of less than 0.5 indicates that an account is likely to be a bot
(bots have fewer followers than friends), whereas accounts with a reputation score that oscillates around
0.5 suggests an account owned by a simple human (Chu et al., 2012).
2. Tweet frequency is defined as an average number of tweets generated by an account on a daily basis.
Dickerson et al. (2012) indicates that a high tweet frequency score could indicate bot behavior. During
the time when bots are active, the number of tweets generated by bots is higher than the number of
tweets generated by human users (Chu et al., 2012). A human-owned account is said to post between
three tweets (average user) and 20 tweets (very active user) a day (Echeverria and Zhou, 2017; Xu and
Yang, 2012).
3. Age of an account: bot accounts tend to have a short lifespan (after being created they usually get
quickly suspended or removed) (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016).
4. A comparison of the number of days tweeted and the age of account computed as activity score (%)
defines the percentage of time in which an account is actively tweeting. Low activity score could
indicate dormant or hibernated malicious accounts (so-called low-profile bots) (Chu et al., 2012,
Echeverria & ZhouGao, 2017).
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5. Average like count: likes help to promote generated content. A high number of likes garnered by a
tweet is a sign of it reaching a wide audience (De Cristofaro, 2014)
6. Average retweet count: accounts whose tweets are heavily retweeted can prove to be influential in
online propagation of the tweet content (Cha et al., 2010)
The descriptive statistics for each of the analyzed datasets presenting the values of defined features can
be found in the appendix of this dissertation.
4.6

Data Preparation and Analysis Overview

The study identifies the characteristics of malicious accounts using past literature that helps to draw
inferences about Twitter accounts’ characteristics based on user metadata, without the need to run
sentiment analysis (Kelly et al., 2012, Lee et al., 2011). The analysis focuses on six types of
characteristics: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account
activity score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet count. To understand the characteristics of
the given datasets, we first conduct descriptive statistical analysis of malicious account behaviors
presented in the datasets.
We download the datasets from the Twitter repository4 and apply the following data preparation
steps. First, we select the attributes presented in Table 9 that we identify as relevant for the analysis of
user tweeting behavior. We also remove rows with missing values from the dataset. Second, we
calculated the values based on the identified features. Finally, we aggregate the data of every analyzed
user account.
To identify the initial number of groups or categories of malicious users within each individual
dataset, the analysis employs density based spatial clustering of application with noise (DBSCAN)
analysis. The study applies DBSCAN because historically this algorithm has proven to be useful in the
discovery of nonlinear clusters, whose sizes are not even (Vaast et al., 2017, Negoita et al., 2018). In
order to consolidate our findings and find common patterns characterizing the malicious accounts, we

4

https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/elections-integrity.html#data
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conduct a K-means cluster analysis, which historically serves as a classic way of finding emerging
patterns in raw data (Lohrmann & Luuka, 2018, van Dam & van de Velden, 2015). While employing KMeans, the study deploys internal consistency such as r-squared and total sum of squared errors to
ensure we arrive at the accurate number of clusters.
To define the number of analyzed clusters, the analysis employs two clustering methods. First,
in order find the suitable number of clusters in the analyzed datasets the study applies density-based
spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN). Second, to ensure consistency of the applied
analysis, the study also uses K-means clustering. Next, the analysis compares internal consistency
measures of the provided data such as pseudo-R2 and total sum of squared errors (SSE). SSE refers to
the sum of squared differences between each observation and its group mean and is used as a measure of
variation within the cluster. The analysis uses the elbow method to find a low enough value of ‘k’ with a
low enough SSE. On top of the SSE measure, the study analyzes R-squared, being an internal
consistency measure, which defines how much of the variation in data is being captured by the
clustering methodology.
4.7

Results

To investigate the differences in malicious behaviors in each of the analyzed countries (Spain
(Catalonia), Iran, Russia, Venezuela) the study applies clustering using the six features of the analyzed
datasets: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account activity
score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet count. The study shows that that our clustering
analysis can serve as evidence that malicious accounts show distinct sets of behaviors. The results of the
clustering analysis, for each individual country, are presented below:
Catalonia (Spain) – Clustering Outcomes
The Catalonian dataset is the smallest of all the datasets analyzed in this study and consists of 75
individual user accounts. The analysis identifies three distinct clusters in the Catalonian dataset, which
are presented and characterized in Table 10. The consistent pattern characterizing the accounts from
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Catalonia show overall low levels of the account activity score. On average, the accounts are active for
13 percent of total time they existed on Twitter. Further breakdown shows that the representatives of
Cluster 1 (simple bots) are, on average, tweeting for 27 percent of the time that they exist on Twitter
whereas representatives of Cluster 2 (celebrities) and Cluster 3 (dormant bots) are only tweeting for 5
and 7 percent of the total time of their existence on Twitter, respectively. As far as tweeting frequency is
concerned, an average number of tweets generated daily by the Catalonian accounts is also low (0.26).
Therefore, on average an account from Catalonia tweets once every four days. The age of accounts
representing Catalonian account clusters is varied and ranges between 196 days (dormant bots) and 1699
days (celebrities).
Table 10 Clusters of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia)
Number
Cluster name

Full Data

Avg.

Avg.

of

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

accounts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

75

413.40

0.3065

1.5717

2.3416

0.2603

0.1301

Cluster 1

Simple bot

21

542.90

0.307

0.6642

0.4767

0.5959

0.2719

Cluster 2

Celebrity

6

1699.33

0.8135

15.396

26.6812

0.1584

0.0513

Cluster 3

Dormant bot

48

196.00

0.2429

0.2408

0.115

0.1261

0.0779

The analysis showcases a close similarity between the patterns of account behaviors that belong
to Clusters 1 and 3. Clusters’ 1 and 3 account reputation scores (0.31 and 0.24) suggest that both clusters
are represented by bot-like accounts. In addition, the said accounts are highly unpopular. The accounts’
tweets receive less than one like each and generate less than one retweet each. However, although the
overall activity score for the accounts for Clusters 1 and 3 is quite low, Cluster 1 accounts are on average
five times more active than Cluster 3 accounts. Besides, Cluster 1 accounts are 2.7 times older than
Cluster 3 accounts when they are removed from the Twitter network. The average age of Cluster 1
accounts is 541 days (approx. 1.5 years), whereas Cluster 3 accounts has an average age of 196 days.
Finally, it is important to note that together, the Cluster 1 and Cluster 3 accounts constitute for

44

approximately 92 percent of all the Catalonian accounts in the data. Based on the several reported
differences between the Clusters 1 and 3, we categorize Cluster 1 accounts as simple bots and Cluster 3
accounts as dormant bots.
Cluster 2 presents a much more distinctive behavior when compared to Clusters 1 and 3. From
prior literature, the observed behavior of Cluster 2 accounts resembles those of highly popular humanowned (celebrity) accounts. For example, Cluster 2 accounts are on average 1699 days (approx. 4 years
9 months) old. Cluster 2 account reputation is also high, scoring 0.81. When analyzing the average like
count, we notice that although the average score for the entire group of Catalonian accounts is quite low
(on average every tweet received 1.5 likes), Cluster 2 accounts’ average like count is significantly higher
(on average each tweet in Cluster 2 generates 15 likes). Similarly, average retweet count scores are also
significantly higher for Cluster 2 accounts (Cluster 2 tweets are on average retweeted almost 27 times).
Therefore, we categorize the Cluster 2 accounts as celebrity accounts.
Iran – Clustering Outcomes
The cluster analysis that we apply onto 651 Iranian malicious accounts generate 11 clusters. The
number of accounts within each cluster is presented in Table 11. The average age of all analyzed Iranian
accounts (475 days) is the highest among all analyzed countries in this study. Iranian tweets are also
most popular, when compared to tweets posted by accounts from other analyzed countries. On average,
every posted tweet generates three likes.
Table 11 Clusters of Identified Features – Iran
Number of

Cluster name
Full Data

Avg.

Avg.

acco-

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

unts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

651

475.13

0.3965

3.0224

0.8316

3.587

0.3272

Cluster 1

Dormant bot

25

2026.68

0.2278

0.4083

0.2035

0.3633

0.0327

Cluster 2

Simple bot

71

596.13

0.1603

0.2511

0.0632

2.5689

0.4001

Cluster 3

Simple bot

140

209.18

0.3272

1.2853

0.2689

1.7769

0.2405
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Table 11 (Continued)
Number of

Avg.

Avg.

acco-

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

Cluster name

unts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 4

Commentator

35

1302.34

0.5843

1.1639

1.2252

4.2086

0.3256

Cluster 5

Influential user

84

220.52

0.505

6.4545

1.0001

2.0189

0.1588

Cluster 6

Viewer

37

911.35

0.4621

1.2626

0.2272

0.2251

0.0786

Cluster 7

Commentator

63

320.79

0.5102

4.1464

1.1346

3.7225

0.4628

Cluster 8

Celebrity

29

472.34

0.9172

21.3811

4.328

1.9928

0.2557

43

728.16

0.7746

3.1047

2.7478

12.9884

0.8252

49

73.04

0.2436

1.8456

0.7589

13.2278

0.8999

75

272.13

0.1506

0.3301

0.0873

0.9428

0.0845

Bot-assisted
Cluster 9

human

Cluster

High activity

10

bot

Cluster

Dormant bot

11

While analyzing the behavior of accounts, we observe that the representatives of Clusters 1, 2, 3,
10 and 11 closely resemble bot-like behavior. This assertion is primarily driven by their account
reputations scores being much lower than the group’s average (0.4), which is caused by the fact that the
accounts have many more followees than followers. The accounts representing Clusters 1 and 11
resemble dormant bot behavior as they report a very low tweet frequency (such accounts are active less
than ten percent of the time they are present on Twitter). The accounts’ posts are also less popular than
the average of the Iranian group. None of the account retweets within either Cluster 1 or Cluster 11
reaches the average group level (one retweet/ every posted tweet). Similarly, none of the accounts’
average like count is higher than the group’s average (three likes per each post).
Clusters 2 and 3 display behavior similar to a simple bot account. The accounts have relatively low
reputation, are tweeting less than 3 tweets a day and are active less than 40 percent of the time they live
on Twitter. The difference between Cluster 2 and 3 is that Cluster 2 accounts are older (596 days),
whereas Cluster 3 accounts are relatively young (on average 209 days).
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Cluster 10 account behavior resembles that of high activity bots. The accounts are active for 89
percent of the total time that they are active on Twitter and post on average of 13 tweets per day. On
average, each of their tweets is retweeted once and receives two likes. Cluster 10 account reputation
level is quite low (0.24) and the accounts are young (73 days).
The representatives of Clusters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 impersonate human-like accounts as their
account reputation scores are either 0.5 or higher. Nevertheless, there are slight differences in the
accounts’ behaviors. The accounts representing Clusters 4 and 7 representatives behave similarly to
human commentator accounts. The accounts tweet, on average, around 4 tweets a day and their tweets
appear relatively popular. On average every Cluster 4 account tweet receives one like and one retweet,
whereas Cluster 7 account tweets receive, on average, four likes and one retweet. The difference
between Clusters 4 and 7 is related to their ages. Cluster 4 stays, on average, 1302 days in the network
whereas Cluster 7, on average, are only active for 320 days.
Cluster 5 account behavior resembles human-owned influencer accounts. The accounts are not
particularly active (on average 16 percent or the time and tweeting two times a day). However, their
tweets are popular (on average, each tweet receives over six likes). The account reputation is, on
average, 0.51 and have an average age of 221 days.
Cluster 6 accounts resemble human-owned viewer accounts. Those accounts are significantly
older (on average 911 days), with an average account reputation of 0.46, and they tweet very rarely (on
average less than 8 percent of the total time).
Cluster 8 accounts resemble celebrity-type behavior. These accounts have the highest level of
reputation (0.92) among all clusters from the Iranian users. Cluster 8 tweets are highly popular – on
average, every tweet posted by a Cluster 8 account receives 21 likes and four retweets. Although Cluster
8 accounts are not particularly active (25 percent of their existence on Twitter). On average, they post
two tweets a day and stay in the Twitter environment for 730 days (two years).
Lastly, Cluster 9 accounts are classified as bot-assisted human accounts. On average the
accounts are active for 82 percent on the time they exist on Twitter. Every account from that group
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posts, on average 13 tweets/ day. Cluster 9 accounts, despite having a very high reputation score (on
average 0.77), post tweets which are not overly popular (on average every tweet receives three likes and
three retweets).
Venezuela – Clustering Outcomes
The analysis extracts three clusters from the 478 Venezuelan malicious accounts. Table 12
presents the number of accounts within each cluster in. Venezuelan accounts’ population is characterized
by the highest tweet frequency among all analyzed datasets (on average 54 tweets a day). They also have
the highest average activity score (67 percent of the total time active on Twitter). The average age of
these accounts is the lowest of all analyzed datasets, at 41 days, clearly making the group distinct from
all the other countries’ account groups.
Table 12 Clusters of Identified Features – Venezuela
Number

Cluster name
Full Data

Avg.

Avg.

of

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

accounts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

478

41.53

0.2495

0.2437

0.2062

54.3816

0.6734

Bot-assisted
Cluster 1

human

42

64.86

0.8924

0.3409

0.2925

55.0207

0.9118

Cluster 2

High activity bot

285

38.62

0.2356

0.338

0.2851

64.0412

0.8746

151

40.52

0.097

0.0387

0.0332

35.9722

0.2273

Dormant high
Cluster 3

activity bot

Cluster 1 account representatives have by far the highest levels of account reputation (0.89),
which suggested a human-owned type of accounts. The representatives of Cluster 1, on average, have
the longest lifespan (65 days) among all the Venezuelan accounts. However, Cluster 1 accounts are also,
on average, posting more than 55 tweets/ day, which could suggest bot-like behavior. On top of that,
tweets posted by Cluster 1 accounts are quite unpopular: on average every three tweets are either
retweeted or liked by other accounts. As a result, we classify Cluster 1 representatives as accounts
resembling bot-assisted human behaviors.
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The relatively low account reputation scores (0.24 and 0.1) of Clusters 2 and 3, suggest a botlike behavior. Further investigation confirms bot-like characteristics of Clusters 2 and 3, which slightly
differs within themselves. For example, Cluster 2 accounts are, on average, much more active (87
percent of the overall activity time) than Cluster 3 accounts (22 percent or the overall activity time).
Cluster 2 accounts are, on average, 39 days old as compared to an average of 41 days represented by
Cluster 3 accounts. Tweet frequency of Cluster 2 accounts is approximately double the tweet frequency
of Cluster 3 accounts. Furthermore, on average, every three tweets posted by Cluster 2 accounts generate
one like whereas every 25 tweets posted by Cluster 3 accounts generate one like. We also note a clearly
visible difference between the number of retweets of the content published by Cluster 2 accounts (on
average every 3rd tweet is retweeted) as compared to Cluster 3 accounts tweets (on average, every 30th
tweet is retweeted). Therefore, we decide to characterize Cluster 2 accounts as high activity bots which
regularly tweet in high bursts. In turn, Cluster 3 accounts are identified as dormant high activity bots,
which stay inactive for the majority (almost 80 percent) of the time on Twitter and are highly active for
relatively short periods of time.
Russia – Clustering Outcomes
The Russian dataset consists of 357 accounts from which we capture five clusters. Average
account reputation score for all Russian accounts (0.42) is the highest among all account datasets
analyzed in this study. At the same time, Russian accounts are on average the least active (12 percent of
the total time). We present the number of accounts within each cluster in Table 13.
Table 13 Clusters of Identified Features – Russia
Number
Cluster name

Full Data
Cluster 1

Dormant bot

Avg.

Avg.

of

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

accounts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

357

360.00

0.4217

2.9894

0.939

6.596

0.1191

142

183.15

0.3198

0.1259

0.1658

1.5256

0.096

22

111.73

0.306

1.6182

0.7301

14.9209

0.7915

High activity
Cluster 2

bot
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Table 13 (Continued)
Number
Cluster name

Avg.

Avg.

of

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

accounts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 3

Viewer

172

512.42

0.4694

0.0902

0.0541

0.4724

0.0283

Cluster 4

Celebrity

14

279.50

0.852

71.0704

20.1005

1.9287

0.1124

7

1143.43

0.8178

0.4621

0.7008

243.0884

0.7227

Bot-assisted
Cluster 5

human

Clusters 1 and 2 report the lowest account reputation scores (0.32 and 0.30) from the whole
Russian accounts group, which suggests bot-like accounts. Cluster 2 accounts are much more active (79
percent of the time they exist on Twitter) than Cluster 1 accounts (active only ten percent of their
existence on Twitter). Moreover, Cluster 2 accounts’ tweeting frequency (on average 15 tweets/ day) is
much higher than the group average (seven tweets a day). On the contrary, Cluster 1 accounts tweet, on
average, two tweets a day. Less intense malicious activity applied by Cluster 1 accounts lets them stay
on the network for a slightly longer time (on average, 183 days) as opposed to intensively tweeting
Cluster 2 accounts (on average, 112 days). Cluster 1 tweets are also relatively unpopular. On average,
every 6th tweet posted by accounts from Cluster 1 receives one retweet. Every 8th tweet populated by
Cluster 1 accounts is, on average, liked once. In turn, Cluster 2 tweets are retweeted slightly more often
(on average, every tweet is retweeted once) and received significantly higher levels of likes (on average,
two likes/ tweet) as compared to Cluster 1 accounts. Based on the findings presented above, we
categorize Cluster 1 accounts as dormant bots and Cluster 2 accounts as high activity bots.
We characterize Cluster 3 accounts as viewers for the following reasons. The average account
reputation scores (0.47) are indicating human-like owners. The lifespan of the accounts (on average, 513
days) is nearly 1.5 times higher than the entire group’s lifespan average (360 days). However, the
accounts are almost completely inoperative (they tweet for three percent of the time) and attract
negligible attention from followers (every 10th tweet receive one like and every 20th tweet is retweeted
once).
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Cluster 4 reports the highest account reputation score (0.85) from the entire Russian account
group and indicate a human-owned account with more followers than followees. The accounts
representing Cluster 4 are tweeting for only 11 percent of the total time of their existence on Twitter and
report relatively low tweeting frequency scores (two tweets/ day). However, the tweets posted by Cluster
4 accounts are very highly popular among their followers (on average, each tweet generates 71 likes and
20 retweets). The average lifespan of those accounts does not exceed 280 days (slightly over nine
months).
The set of behaviors identified in Cluster 5 makes the accounts distinct from other
representatives of the Russian account group. Cluster 5 account reputation score (0.82) is much higher
than an average account reputation for all Russian accounts (0.42), which suggests that Cluster 5
representatives are highly popular celebrities. What is more, Cluster 5 accounts are present in the Twitter
environment for a significantly longer period of time (on average, the age of Custer 5 accounts is 1143
days as opposed to an average of 360 days for all Russian accounts). Also, Cluster 5 accounts are very
actively tweeting (73 percent of the time of their existence on Twitter). However, tweeting frequency of
Cluster 5 accounts is very aggressive (on average, each account posts 243 tweets/ a day) which would
suggest bot-generated actions. What is more, the posted tweets are highly unpopular among the
accounts’ followers. On average, only every second posted tweet receives one like or one retweet. The
set of identified behaviors suggests that the accounts representing Cluster 5 can potentially be classified
as bot-assisted humans.
4.8

Discussion

The main goal for this study is to understand and compare the characteristics of malicious account
behavior strategies. To do that, the study analyzes the published Twitter data archive originating in
Spain (Catalonia), Russia, Venezuela and Iran. The analysis applies clustering analysis on the four
distinctive country datasets and explore the data using the following six account features: (1) account
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reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account activity score, (5) average
like count and (6) average retweet count.
The first step is to understand the characteristics of the malicious agents representing every
analyzed country. The defined account features helps to identify distinct clusters that originate from the
analyzed countries. For example, the study finds the longest-lived accounts in the Iranian dataset (on
average, the accounts live 475 days). Also, the tweets originating from Iran are highly popular (on
average, every tweet receive three likes) but in the same time the accounts that post these tweets are not
quite active (on average the accounts are actively tweeting for 33 percent of the total time they exist on
Twitter). The shortest average account age (42 days) among all the analyzed countries represents the
Venezuelan dataset. The Venezuelan accounts are highly active (on average, 67 percent of the time they
exist on Twitter) and apply highly aggressive tweeting strategy (each account posts, on average, 54
tweets a day). However, their tweets appear to be highly unpopular (on average, every fourth generates
tweet receives one like and every fifth generates tweet is retweeted one time).
Table 14 Identified Features Average Values - Country Comparison
Number

Avg.

Avg.

of

Age of

Account

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

accounts

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Catalonia

75

413.40

0.3065

1.5717

2.3416

0.2603

0.1301

Iran

651

475.13

0.3965

3.0224

0.8316

3.587

0.3272

Venezuela

478

41.53

0.2495

0.2437

0.2062

54.3816

0.6734

Russia

357

360.00

0.4217

2.9894

0.939

6.596

0.1191

As presented in Table 15 the clustering analysis showcases that in every analyzed country we
distinguish between the various types of human-like and bot-like malicious actors. In three of the
analyzed countries (Venezuela, Russia and Iran) the study also identifies cyborg-like account clusters,
which show both human-like and bot-like behaviors combined together (we call those accounts botassisted humans). However, the number of identified clusters followed by the variety of identified
accounts and their distributions is different depending on the analyzed country.
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Table 15 Cluster Representations per Country
Spain

Iran

Russia

Venezuela

(Catalonia)
Simple bot

X

X

Celebrity

X

X

X

Dormant bot

X

X

X

Commentator

X

Influential user

X

Viewer

X

X

Bot-assisted human

X

X

X

High activity bot

X

X

X

Dormant high activity bot

X

The study extracts three clusters from the Catalonian dataset (simple bots, celebrities, and
dormant bots), three clusters in the Venezuelan dataset (bot-assisted humans, high activity bots, dormant
high activity bots), five clusters in the Russian dataset (dormant bots, high activity bots, viewers,
celebrities and bot assisted humans) and 11 clusters in the Iranian dataset, which we further group in the
following representations: dormant bots, simple bots, high activity bots, bot-assisted humans, celebrities,
commentators, influential users and viewers. In every analyzed dataset we are able to identify clusters of
dormant bot-like accounts. For example, dormant bots represent 64 percent of all the Catalonian, 31
percent of the Venezuelan, 40 percent of the Russian and 15 percent of the Iranian malicious accounts'
dataset. Next, we find that the balance between bot-like and human-like accounts is different for all four
datasets. For example, the share of bot accounts in the whole population is at a rate of 46 percent for the
Russian dataset, 92 percent for the Catalonian dataset, 91 percent for the Venezuelan dataset and 55
percent for the Iranian dataset.
Interestingly enough, after we compare the longevity of the clusters representing all four
countries together, we find out that accounts whose behavior resembles human-like actions are able to
survive longer in the network than the bot-like representatives. This goes in line with the past findings
presented by Lee et al. (2011). As presented in Figure 6, top five longest lived account clusters are
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represented by the following human-like or bot-assisted human-like clusters: celebrities (Catalonia),
commentators (Iran), bot-assisted humans (Russia), viewers (Iran) and bot-assisted humans (Iran). In
turn, bot-like accounts: high activity bots (Venezuela, Iran, and Russia) and simple bots (Iran) represent
four out of five of the shortest-lived account clusters.
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Figure 6 Longevity of Identified Accounts

Finally, the study analyzes the popularity of tweets based on tweeting strategies applied in the
four analyzed countries. Past literature defines that a tweet is popular when it is being reshared (Zhao et
al., 2015, Zadeh and Sharda, 2014, Wu and Shen, 2015) or receives a high number of likes (favorites)
(Zadeh and Sharda, 2014). Therefore, the study first analyzes country averages for the number of likes
and retweets per posted tweet. As presented in Figure 7, we summarize an average number of retweets
and likes per tweet and present the findings as a bar chart that characterizes every analyzed country.
Average values that we compute suggest that the Catalonian tweets look to be most popular (on average,
every tweet posted by one of the Catalonian accounts received 1.5 likes and 2.3 retweets). Russian
accounts’ tweets receive on average three likes and 0.9 retweets and Iranian tweets receive 3 likes and
0.8 retweets. The least popular tweets are generated by the Venezuelan accounts (on average every tweet
generates 0.3 likes and 0.2 retweets). This stays in opposition with the fact that Venezuelan accounts

54

have the highest activity rates (on average, they are active for 67 percent of the time of their existence on
Twitter) and are tweeting most aggressively (on average, each account tweets 54 tweets a day) among all
analyzed countries.

Avg. like +retweet count per tweet

Average likes+retweets per tweet per country
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Catalonia

Iran

Venezuela

Avg. like count

Russia

Avg. retweet count

Figure 7 Average Likes and Retweets per Tweet per Country

As a next step we calculate the total numbers of likes and retweets per country by multiplying
the average numbers of likes and retweets by the total number of accounts in each dataset (Catalonia –
75 accounts, Iran – 651 accounts, Venezuela – 478 accounts, Russia – 357 accounts). The total values of
likes and retweets per country presented in Figure 8 suggest that the sole fact of deployment of a high
number of malicious accounts does not guarantee that the message propagated with the use of such
accounts will be popular. For example, 478 Venezuelan accounts generate fewer retweets and likes than
75 Catalonian accounts and considerably fewer retweets and likes than 357 accounts originating in
Russia.
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Figure 8 Total Likes and Retweets per Country

Given that the share of bot accounts in the whole population is at a rate of 46 percent for the
Russian dataset, 55 percent for the Iranian dataset, 92 percent for the Catalonian dataset, and 91 percent
for the Venezuelan dataset we conclude that a blend of bot and human-like accounts proves to be more
effective than the predominant application of bot accounts in populating malicious content on Twitter.
4.9

Implications for Research

This chapter presents evidence that malicious accounts originating from different countries apply highly
distinct strategies to pollute social network with malicious tweets. The analysis also showcases that
tweets originating from countries that use both bot-like and human-like accounts as propagators, are
more popular than tweets originating from countries that predominantly rely on high numbers of
aggressively tweeting bots. There is a number of potential research implications and contributions
generated by our findings. The work presented in this chapter contributes to the enhanced understanding
of malicious account behaviors and their strategies to popularize malicious content. The chapter extends
prior work on investigation of malicious accounts behaviors.
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4.10 Conclusions
The contribution of this chapter is as follows. The chapter extracts six different measures of malicious
account behavior from the datasets released by Twitter: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting
frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account activity score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet
count. Extracted features capture an account’s longevity, popularity, tweeting behavior, and reputation.
Due to the high heterogeneity of malicious accounts’ behaviors, the analysis employs a DBSCAN and
K-means cluster analysis to group the accounts according to the mentioned account characteristics. In
the four presented datasets the study identifies clusters of malicious accounts that show different tactics
of propagating misinformation on a Twitter platform. Identified clusters help gaining a better
understanding of malicious account behavior in populating misinformation. As a result of our analysis
we find that accounts whose behavior resembles human-like actions are able to survive longer in the
network than the bot-like representatives. The study showcases that malicious accounts originating from
different countries apply highly distinct strategies to make their tweets popular and in doing this,
effectively pollute the social network. Another finding shows that tweets originating from countries that
use both bot-like and human-like accounts as propagators are more popular than tweets originating from
countries that predominantly rely on high numbers of aggressively tweeting bots.
As a next step, we create an agent-based model for evaluating social media policies through
simulation captured in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. With the use of the simulation, the study
undertakes inductive extraction of malicious accounts’ data published by Twitter. The study proposes
agent-based modeling (ABM) as a method for representing both malicious and legitimate social media
agents, along with their key behaviors. Such a model is especially useful in gaining a better
understanding of social media network dynamics and helps implement and evaluate a policy intervention
that targets malicious behavior on such platforms. Constructing an agent-based model of the Twitter
environment helps to understand the impacts of malicious accounts on tweet propagation. When
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simulating a social media network, we can evaluate how a hypothetical policy intervention impacts
propagation of malicious content on social media platforms.
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CHAPTER 5. USING AGENT-BASED MODELING TO ADDRESS MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR
ON SOCIAL MEDIA5
This chapter introduces and discusses the agent-based simulation of Twitter environment. First, the
chapter reviews past research that deploys agent-based modeling to investigate phenomena on the
Twitter platform. Second, the chapter presents an agent-based model and underlying assumptions
tailored for policy evaluation. The description of the agent-based model presents the characteristics of
malicious and legitimate agents defined in the simulation. Third, the chapter provides a definition of
interaction between the identified agents. Next, the chapter reports the results of the defined agent-based
simulation, presents statistics and graphs and discusses the results.
5.1

Background and Motivation

The motivation behind this chapter is to create an agent-based platform for evaluating social media
policies through simulation. Although some fear that social media policies can potentially curb open
discourse, disallow free speech or oppress unpopular opinions (Arnold, 2018, Bradshaw et al., 2018),
social network providers are likely to implement such policies in the near future (Leetaru, 2019,
Schwartz, 2019). Social media policies help ensure responsible use of social media tools and mitigate
the risks related to the use of social media platforms (Hrdinova et al., 2010). For example, Grinberg et
al. (2019) suggest that social media outlets should actively seek ways to discourage social media users
from following or sharing fake news content. To do that, social media platforms need to apply policies
that prevent unwanted content from flooding the network (Grinberg et al., 2019, Roberts, 2018). Based
on our observations of past social media outlets’ unsuccessful attempts to control malicious actors, we

5

Portions of this chapter have been previously published in the Proceedings of the International Conference on
Information Systems (ICIS 2019) and have been reproduced with permission from the Association of Information
Systems
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believe that new social media policies need to be tested and refined before they can be successfully
applied in a live social network setting. Furthermore, the consequences of such policies should be better
understood before implementation in live settings. We propose agent-based modeling (ABM) as a
method for representing both malicious and legitimate social media agents, along with their key
behaviors. The goal of this chapter is to define a simulated network of Twitter actors, which consists of
malicious and legitimate accounts. Two main research questions we discuss in this chapter are as
follows. 1. How do we build an agent-based model of a social media platform to address social media
regulation? 2. How can an agent-based simulation approach be used to assess the effectiveness of social
media policies? This chapter shows how agent-based models of a Twitter-like network can extend
current research on Twitter and contribute to research on controlling malicious accounts in the more
general social media environment. The design of the model is based on findings collected from the
literature review, descriptive analyses and clustering-based research presented in Chapter 4. The end
goal of constructing an agent-based model of the social media environment is to assess the impact of
policy intervention aimed at curbing malicious behavior on social media outlets through simulation
which we present in Chapter 6. Figure 9 presents the steps that lead to creation and deployment of the
agent-based model presented in this chapter.

Figure 9 Creation and Deployment of the ABM Model
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We use the findings presented in previous chapters of this dissertation when populating the
proposed agent network with various agent types. Chapters 2 – 4 focus on understanding and
categorizing of malicious and non-malicious types of social media users. Chapter 2 provides a thorough
literature review that presents and discusses the types of bots, humans and cyborgs on Twitter. Chapter 3
investigates how malicious accounts impact retweeting process of legitimate posts. Chapter 4 analyzes
malicious Twitter account features and clusters the analyzed accounts based on the behavior they
present. Chapter 5 focuses on creation and validation of an agent-based model, which we then use to test
social media policy implementations in Chapter 6.
5.2

Literature Review

5.2.1

Agent-Based Models of Twitter Network

Agent-based models are often created with the goal of running granular or ‘bottom-up’ simulations, with
system wide behaviors emerging from the process. Agents in such models have unique characteristics
and their behavior is simulated based on pre-defined rules and assumptions. As an output, macro-level
patterns emerge from the agents’ interactions (Groff, 2007). In particular, ABM appears to be the right
tool to be used for simulations of Twitter as Twitter is a complex system defined by the interaction of a
number of heterogeneous agents. Agent-based models have proven to be particularly useful in analyzing
phenomena that are difficult to model using differential equation-based models (Rahmandad & Sterman,
2008). As far as Twitter is concerned, ABM is likely to be useful for investigating ‘what-if’ questions
that project simulated future scenarios rather than modeling the past. Also, an agent-based simulation
appears to be a natural fit to conduct social media tests and analyses because of its cost effectiveness as
compared to other methods of policy testing (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). Rahmandad & Sterman
(2008) argue that agent-based modeling can be used to simulate targeted attacks or random failures and
help test out network interactions using the creation or removal of links or nodes connecting network
agents.
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Previous research on social media that uses agent-based modeling is quite diverse and explores a
number of aspects related to social media networks. Table 16 serves as a summary of literature on agentbased simulations of social media networks.
Table 16 Selected Literature on Agent-Based Simulations of Social Media Networks

Year

Author

Agent-based Model Focus

Type of ABM
Network Topology

2019

Ross et al.

The impact of manipulative actors in social

Small-world network

networks

supported by powerlaw tailed distributions

2018

Fan et al.

Replication of diffusion patterns of emotion

Directed network

contagion on social media
2016

2015

Charlton et

Relationship between Twitter users’ sentiment

al.

levels

Sathanur et

Controlling of viral rumor activity spread

al.
2015

2015

2014

Not provided

Stochastic blockmodel topology

Plikynas et

Controlling of propagation of excitation on social

al.

media

Attema et al.

Prediction of future volumes of tweets based on

Dynamic Random

simulated past user behavior

Graph Model

Social media policies for promoting information

Zombie-city model

Tang et al.

Bi-modal model

propagation
2014

Yang et al.

Population growth and message propagation

Not defined

among Twitter financial communities
2013

Gatti et al.

Information spread across online social networks

Egocentric network

during 2012 US presidential race
2013

Van Maanen

Investigation of social influence on online social

& van der

media

Not provided

Vecht
2011

Liu & Chen

Rumor spreading on Twitter-like microblogging
sites
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Scale-free network

Table 16 (Continued)

Year

Author

Agent-based Model Focus

Type of ABM
Network Topology

2010

Graham

Self-organization of communities through

Scale-free network

Twitter

Most recent work deploys agent-based modeling to analyze the impact on manipulated opinions
on social media (Ross et al., 2019). In order to investigate how manipulated opinions can influence
social media networks, the researchers use spiral of silence theory. They refer to complex adaptive
systems and propose a simulated model that defines interactions as a network. Ross et al. (2019) argues
that even low number of bots that constitute 2-4% of a given social network can change the public
opinion formation on social media outlets. In turn, Sathanur et al. (2015) and Liu & Chen (2011) use
agent-based simulation to investigate the propagation of rumors on social media outlets. Sathanur et al.
(2015) proposes a model for controlling viral activity which is based on two strategies. First strategy
relies on activity-based centrality and targets influential nodes that are context-dependent. Second
strategy introduces agents whose goal is to populate anti-rumor messages. Liu & Chen (2011) argue that
rumors on twitter-like networks, as compared to other types of social media outlets, propagate with
higher degree of unpredictability. Also, the researchers find that propagation of such rumors is usually
highly efficient and has a tendency to repeat itself. Yang et al. (2014) and Gatti et al. (2013) introduce
ABM to understand how information gets propagated on social media. Yang et al. (2014) investigate
ways to slowing down propagation of malicious messages. The model proposed by Yang et al. (2014)
simulates the 2013 Associated Press hoax and find that if one removes influential nodes the process of
message propagation slows down significantly. Gatti et al. (2013) simulate Barack Obama’s Twitter
network and study how information spreads on social network if influential nodes are deactivated.
Tang et al. (2014) use an agent-based model to test social media policies for promoting
information propagation on social media. The researchers build a simulated interest-based model to test
out proposed policies. Tang et al. (2014) find that in order a policy could be effective, users need to
63

show the following two types of behaviors: following other user accounts and retweeting content
propagated by other users. Van Maanen and van der Vecht (2013) use agent-based simulation to
investigate online social influence. The researchers propose a simulated model that incorporates
consistency, liking and social proof as basic behavioral principles of social influence. The researchers
simulate use cases of user behavior on Twitter and propose a general model of online social influence. In
turn, Fan et al. (2018) propose an agent-based model to replicate emotion diffusion patterns. The
researchers reproduce empirical data patterns and simulate competition and emotion contagion. The
findings of the study suggest that with narrowing gap between the emotions of anger and joy on social
media, anger is likely to dominate on social media.
Plikynas et al. (2015) use agent-based modeling to simulate the control of excitation information
propagation on social media. The researchers propose a wave-propagation model and find that excitation
propagation patterns have their origins in a user ability to adopt behaviors that have been already
adopted by a user’s neighbors. Graham (2010) applies ABM to investigate how communities selforganize on the Twitter network. The researcher uses preferential attachment to propose a simulation of
user behavior on Twitter network. Attema et al. (2015) use ABM to simulate a prediction of future
volumes of tweets based on past user behavior. The researchers simulate and compare two models. First
model solely contains a retweet graph and the second model also takes individual behavior into
consideration. By this, the researchers propose that the method can be used by companies that want to
monitor activity on social media outlets. Charlton et al. (2016) use agent-based modeling to simulate the
dynamics of sentiments and relations between users’ sentiments on Twitter. The proposed model
generates outputs of user emotive response. The researchers find that users that communicate
extensively and that have a high dynamic centrality measure are likely to use positive sentiment more
often than negative sentiment.
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5.2.2

Accounts’ Behavior Classification

Past literature provides valuable information on the classification of both legitimate and malicious actors
on social media platforms based on the actors’ behaviors, which can be used to create a simulated
model. Table 1 and Table 2 presented in Chapter 2 summarize the literature on the classification of
Twitter accounts, which we use to define an agent-based model of the Twitter network presented in later
section of this chapter. Below we provide examples of past research findings defining bot and humanowned account types, which later served as an input into the simulation model.
Varol et al. (2017) provide a distinction between (1) simple bots, which are likely to retweet
other simple bots and (2) sophisticated bots, which usually retweet human accounts. Freitas et al. (2015)
define (1) high activity bots, which tweet between 1 and 60 minutes and (2) low activity bots, which
generate tweets between 1 and 120 minutes. Abokhodair et al. (2015) define five types of bots:
peripheral bots followed by core bots and their subtypes: short-lived bots, long-lived bots and generator
bots. Varol et al. (2014) provide a distinction between influential users and information consumers.
Influential users’ tweets are usually popular and receive high numbers of retweets whereas information
consumers usually retweet others’ tweets. Tinati et al. (2012) provide characteristics of five categories of
human behavior on Twitter and grouped the users into the following categories: idea starters, amplifiers,
curators, commentators, viewers.
Cha et al. (2012) group Twitter users into three categories: (1) ‘mass media’ accounts that have a
large number of followers but do not follow many accounts themselves, (2) ‘grassroots’ accounts
represented by ordinary users and (3) ‘evangelists’ accounts represented by opinion leaders, celebrities
or politician accounts. Chu et al. (2012), apart from identifying human and bot accounts, also provide a
description of cyborg accounts (bot-assisted humans or human-assisted bots), which are an
amalgamation of human and bot accounts. Stringhini et al. (2010) identify two categories of bots. The
first category, called ‘bragger,’ posts spam tweets on their own Twitter pages, which are then visible on
the followers’ feeds (only followers and not their contacts can see such spam tweets). The second
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category, ‘whisperer,’ sends direct spam messages to users, without posting the content on the Twitter
webpage. Krishnamurthy et al. (2008) distinguish between the following types of human-owned
accounts: (1) broadcasters run by media outlets such as newspapers or radio stations whose number of
followers exceeds the number of followees, (2) acquaintances, whose number of followees and followers
is usually similar; (3) miscreants represented by spammers or stalkers and (4) evangelists, who reach out
to other users to collect new followers.
5.3

Model Definition

After reviewing past literature on Twitter actor classifications, we could not find a classification
presented in a single paper which would serve as a basis for a simulated agent-based Twitter network
containing a variety of legitimate and malicious actors. Past taxonomies of Twitter actors do not address
the complexity of a Twitter network containing both malicious and legitimate entities. General findings
related to the presentation of legitimate account characteristics are supported in past research and similar
patterns emerge from the past taxonomies when one considers the behaviors of the identified actors. As
far as malicious actors characteristics are concerned, we use the findings of the clustering research
presented in the earlier chapter. Therefore, when defining the ABM simulation, we combine the findings
from the existing literature that classifies human-like actors with the clustering findings that present
malicious account characteristics. We incorporate the findings in the simulated agent-based model and
describe them below. We define our agent-based model and its rules as follows. The agent-based model
of the Twitter network comprises the following parts: (1) the agent ecosystem, (2) behavioral rules for
each agent and (3) the communication mechanism (such as tweets, likes and retweets). We follow the
design science research methodology (Hevner et al., 2004) and propose an artifact in the form of a
simulated agent-based model of a social media network.
5.3.1

Twitter Model Ecosystem

This subchapter discusses the creation of the model ecosystem and its assumptions. The study uses
Python as a programing tool to implement the agent-based model. The study defines five legitimate user
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types (‘amplifier’, ‘broadcaster’, ‘commentator’, ‘influencer and ‘viewer’) and two malicious user types
(‘smart bot’ and ‘simple bot’). We also add one custom agent (‘celebrity’) which serves as an
instantiation of a Donald Trump Twitter (TRMP) account. We allow the defined agents to act in a
random order each tick (day). Figure 10 serves as a description of the process in which we instantiate the
agents and create connections between them in the proposed model. As a first step we add subsequent
types of agents into the model. Next we collect the set of distinct agent classes. Finally, we establish
follower – followee relationships in the agent-based model.

Figure 10 Instantiation of Agents and Connection Creation

The study models the topology of a defined simulation as a network with a scale-free degree
distribution. Scale-free networks originate from a preferential attachment rule and are usually not
homogeneous (Barabasi and Bonabeau, 2003, Fortunato et al., 2006). Preferential attachment
characterizes social media environments in such a way that the majority of nodes in scale-free networks
do not have many connections. However, some nodes in a social media environment are expected to
have many connections (Wang and Chen, 2003). This study applies preferential attachment
characteristics into a simulated model of a social media environment.
In the defined agent-based simulation we set the population of 1000 agents. Such relatively
small population deployed in an agent-based model is generally known to reduce the time of simulation
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computation and helps to analyze the simulation more extensively (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008).
Each simulation iteration runs for ten ticks (ten simulated days). At the end of each tick (day), the model
captures and records statistics that we discuss below.
To describe the characteristics of the generated groups of agents and the simulated network as a
whole, we use evaluation metrics that we compute after each tick (day) and when each simulation
iteration is complete (after ten ticks (days)). Table 17 presents the description of network-related
statistics.
Table 17 Description of Twitter Network Evaluation Metrics Computed Each Day (Tick)

Metric

Formula

Actively tweeting users

Number of actively tweeting users

Actively retweeting users

Number of actively retweeting users

5.3.2

Agents and Their Behaviors

Along with defining the model’s environment, we develop a basic characteristics of the agents (Twitter
account owners) presented in the model. We present below a detailed description of the agent behavior
characteristics.
Since we are not able to identify one single classification in the past literature that would
thoroughly define our agent-based model, we combine past literature-based findings on the types of
Twitter agents with the outcomes of clustering research presented in previous chapters. Following Bessi
& Ferrara (2016) we assume that around 15% of all accounts are represented by malicious accounts and
we assign legitimate accounts to the remaining 85% of the agents. In order to define malicious agents in
the agent-based model, we follow the Varol et al. (2017) classification and generated simple bot agents
as well as sophisticated bot agents. We follow the findings of Chu et al. (2012) and assume that 60% of
the defined malicious accounts have fewer followers than followees. Among the remaining 40% of
malicious accounts, we assume that half of the bot population has a balanced number of followers and
followees, whereas the other half has more followers than followees. As far as legitimate accounts are
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concerned, we define the agents following the findings published by Krishnamurthy et al. (2008) and
Tinati et al. (2012). We define six types of legitimate agents: (1) ‘influencer,’ (2) ‘celebrity,’ (3)
‘broadcaster,’ (4) ‘amplifier,’ (5) ‘commentator’ and (6) ‘viewers’ (40% of the whole simulated
population (Echeverria & Zhou, 2017)).
Every kind of agents is characterized by activity patterns such as expected tweet and retweet
amount range generated by each agent every day (tick). Table 18 presents the set of characteristics,
which define agents’ behaviors in the simulated agent-based model.
Table 18 Defined Sets of Characteristics for Simulated Network of Agents

Agents and their characteristics

%

Twee

Re-

#of

Atten

Re-

ts per

tweet

follo-

-tion

tweet

day

s per

wees

span

proba

day

bility

Simple bot (SIM)

9

5-50

No. of followees > no. of followers; posts

15-

100-

150

1000

1-10

100-

300

0.1

300

0.1

more than 1600 tweets/ week; retweets other
simple bot agents (Varol et al., 2017); over 50%
of populated content is related to retweeting
activities (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). Agents with
similar behavior patterns: ‘high activity bot’
(Freitas et al., 2015), ‘bot’ (Chu et al., 2012),
‘short-lived bot’ (Abokhodair et al., 2015)
Sophisticated bot (SMT)

6

Posts on average 4 tweets a day and less than 70

0-5

1000

tweets/week, usually not more than 2 tweets a
day (Lee et al, 2011); high retweet levels of
human-generated content (Varol et al., 2017).
Agents with similar behavior patterns: ‘low
activity bot’ (Freitas et al., 2015), ‘long-lived
bot’ (Abokhodair et al., 2015)
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Table 18 (Continued)

Agents and their characteristics

%

Twee

Re-

#of

Atten

Re-

ts per

tweet

follo-

-tion

tweet

day

s per

wees

span

proba

day

bility

Influencer (INF)

0.05

0-5

0-3

Generates popular tweets and receives high

50-

100-

500

300

50-

100-

500

300

10-

100-

1000

300

500-

100-

3000

300

100-

100-

1000

300

0.1

numbers of retweets (Varol et al., 2014). Agents
with similar behavior patterns: ‘idea starter’
(Tinati et al., 2012), ‘evangelist’ (Cha et al.,
2012)
Celebrity (CLB)

0.05

0-5

0-3

Chu et al. (2012) add celebrity-owned accounts,

0.1

which are closely related to broadcasters’
category
Broadcaster (BRD)

0.45

5-15

1-10

Accounts run by newspapers, radio stations,

0.1

etc.; no. of followees < no. of followers
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2008). Agents with
similar behavior patterns: ‘mass media user’
(Cha et al., 2012)
Amplifier (AMP)

15

0-5

2-20

Shares others’ ideas; more likely to retweet

0.1

others’ ideas than post own tweets (Tinati et al.,
2012). Agents with similar behavior patterns:
‘information consumer’ (Varol et al., 2014),
‘curator’ (Tinati et al., 2012)
Viewer (VWR)

40

Takes passive interest in conversations on
Twitter (Tinati et al., 2012); does not post any
tweets or retweets (Echeverria & Zhou, 2017)
Agents with similar behavior patterns:
‘grassroots user’ (Cha et al., 2012)
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0

0

0.1

Table 18 (Continued)

Agents and their characteristics

%

Twee

Re-

#of

Atten

Re-

ts per

tweet

follo-

-tion

tweet

day

s per

wees

span

proba

day

bility

Commentator (COM)

25

Ordinary human-owned accounts; number of

0-3

0-5

100-

100-

3000

300

0.1

followees = number of followers
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2008); usually has 100 3000 followers and followees; most active users
tweet 10 -200 times/ week; usually retweet
others’ tweets (Xu & Yang, 2012). Agents with
similar behavior patterns: ‘acquaintance’
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2008)

The tweet and retweet rates are different for every individual agent since a random process generates
daily actions on a tick-by-tick basis. Figure 11 depicts a conceptual model of tweeting and retweeting
process which is based on the assigned probabilities.
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Figure 11 Tweeting and Retweeting Processes - Overview

Statistics that we use to describe agent behaviors are presented in Table 19. The model captures statistics
related to agent tweet frequency, total tweet count and agent reputation.
Table 19 Description of Twitter Agent Account Evaluation Metrics

Metric

Formula

Tweet frequency

The number of tweets generated by an account

Total retweet count

Total number of retweets per tweet

Agent reputation

#follower/ (#follower+#following)
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5.3.3

Communication Mechanism Between Agents

The diagram presented in Figure 12 provides an overview of the retweeting and tweeting simulation
process flow. Before tweeting and retweeting processes take place, we instantiate the agents and
establish follower – followee relations between them. After that, a simulation for any random agent
starts and continues for each tick. We define the process of tweeting is based on randomization rule and
follows the assumptions on human limits of information processing. We shape the process of retweeting
using preferential attachment theory. Detailed process of tweeting and retweeting mechanisms is
described in detail in the next sections of this chapter.

Figure 12 Tweeting and Retweeting Mechanism – Overview

Similarly to Ross et al. (2019), the study refers to preferential attachment rule when modeling
follower connection rules between agents that plays a major role in shaping the retweeting mechanism
between agents in our model. Barabasi and Bonabeau (2003) argue that online users tend to connect only
a small group of nodes that are easy to find. The more users connect to a certain node, the stronger is a
bias towards that node and other users keep connecting to the node making it increasingly popular.
Similarly, in the Twitter agent network, tweets posted by popular account holders are more likely to be
retweeted more often or receive more likes than tweets originating from unpopular accounts. Tweets
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posted by unpopular accounts (e.g., simple bots that follow legitimate users but are not followed back)
tend to receive low numbers of likes and retweets.
Another mechanism that shapes the propagation of tweets on a simulated network is related to
the concept of limits of human processing (Miller, 1956, Simon, 1990, Eisenberg, 1995). Human ability
to process information is constrained (Eisenberg, 1995) and when levels of information input to which a
person is exposed increases, the likelihood of missing an important part of the presented information by
that person increases as well (Miller, 1956). Short-term memory of human brain can process a limited
amount of information (Simon, 1990). We simulate our model in such a way so that it reflects the
limitation of humans in processing information. In our setting, we implement a news feed mechanism
that ensures the agents are exposed to only most recent subset of all the tweets, especially the tweets
which are either viral in nature or very recent. This is critical as in real life when a human user accesses
their account there is only a few tweets that are screened on the social media main page visible to the
user.
Figure 13 presents an in-depth explanation of the retweeting process. For each agent we
simulate a level of attention span by a random generation of a number within the proposed range. The
retweeting process simulation follows when tweets are selected for retweet based on how recent they are
and what is the attention span that is assigned to them. After the retweet cycle finishes, the model
captures retweet statistics of the generated retweet values.
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Figure 13 Retweeting Process

Communication patterns between agents dependent on additional factors that influence the way
how tweeting process is modelled. Figure 14 presents an in-depth explanation of the tweeting process.
For example, the fact that we differentiate between types of behaviors of modelled agents impacts the
number of tweets generated by those agents. Each of the agent types has different upper and lower limits
of tweets they can generate per tick (e.g., on average broadcasters generate more tweets than
commentators or viewers). The number of tweets that every agent generates in each tick is randomly
generated and falls between the predefined upper and lower tweet limits that we define for specific agent
kinds.
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Figure 14 Tweeting Process

5.4

Results

This section presents the results of the simulation. First, it provides a general overview of the simulation
process and explains how the process works. Second, it discusses how we compute the results. To
execute the simulation, the study follows a defined set of process steps presented in Figure 15. Before
we execute the simulation, we first populate the initial network with agents (we present a detailed
description of that process in the previous subchapter). Second, we create a data frame for simulation
statistics and collect the statistics for tick 0. Next, the simulation starts and the defined agents act
according to the defined rules which we discuss in the previous subchapter. The system records and
updates the end-of-tick statistics. After ten ticks the simulation ends and the system records aggregated
cumulative network statistics.
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Figure 15 ABM Simulation Process

As a first step we create and add to the simulation model an additional agent (TRMP) that is based on
the characteristics of real Donald Trump Twitter account and behaves similarly to the Influencer (INF)
agent in in the existing simulation model. As a next step we collate the tweets that originate from Donald
Trump’s Twitter account together with the values characterizing the retweets of Donald Trump’s tweets.
We use Donald Trump Twitter account’s tweet content that we analyze in Chapter 3 to categorize the
tweets according to the number of retweets they received. We focus on two aspects: 1) the total amount
of retweets a certain tweet garners and 2) the number of retweets the tweet gathers on a day-to-day basis.
Similarly to the study presented in Chapter 3, we group the tweets into three broader categories (“Rocket
Ships”, “Jets” and “Blimps”) to get a better understanding of the retweet behavior. As a next step we
simulate the propagation of real tweets that originated from Donald Trump agent (TRMP) using the
created agent-based model. We analyze retweet levels of the mentioned tweet groups (“Rocket Ships”,
“Jets” and “Blimps”) that followed throughout 7 days (ticks) after tweets were posted.
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The model generates the following descriptive statistics and analyzes tweets originating from
every group of defined agents:
1. Reputation score (mean calculated for a group of agents)
2. Follower count (mean calculated for a 10-day/ tick time range)
3. Follower count (min value)
4. Follower count (max value)
5. Retweeted count (mean calculated for a 10-day/ tick time range)
6. Retweeted count (min value)
7. Retweeted count (max value)
8. Retweets count (mean calculated for a 10-day/ tick time range)
9. Retweets count (min value)
10. Retweets count (max value)
11. Tweet count (mean calculated for a 10-day/ tick time range)
12. Tweet count (min value)
13. Tweet count (max value)
The ecosystem is set to 1000 agents, there is only a single agent representing an ‘influential
user’ (INF) and one ‘celebrity’ (CLB) agent that simulates Donald Trump’s account behavior and
incorporates influencer-like behavior followed by five agents representing ‘broadcaster’ (BRD) type.
These are the rare celebrity and professional media types. Other agents presented in the simulated
network are as follows: ‘amplifier’ (AMP), consisting of 150 agents, ‘commentator’ (COM) that consists
of 250 agents, ‘simple bot’ (SIM) represented by 90 agents and ‘sophisticated bots’ (SMT) represented
by 60 agents. The base agent ‘viewer’ (VWR) type is a variant of the Commentator (COM) agent class
and consists of 443 agents.
Table 20 presents reputation score and mean, minimum and maximum follower rate values for
every agent kind. Celebrity account reports a high reputation score (0.99) which is similar to reputation
scores of real-life celebrity accounts on Twitter. Similarly, broadcaster and influencer agents enjoy high
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reputation scores (0.94 and 0.97) whereas amplifiers and commentators show much lower reputation
score levels (0.44 and 0.38). All simulated values closely reflect the values that characterize real Twitter
actors.
As far as retweet rates are concerned, the values generated by the agent-based model reflects the
characteristics of real-life Twitter actors. For example, simple bots whose role is to aggressively promote
malicious content retweet on average 44.2 tweets per day. In the same time, amplifiers retweet around 9
tweets a day whereas celebrities and influencers, who in real-life mostly tweet own-generated content, in
the simulated model retweet less than 2 tweets/ day.
Table 20 Reputation Score, Follower and Retweet Rates by Agent Type

Kind

# of

Reputati

Follower

Follower

Follower

Retweets

Retweets

Retweets

of

Agents

on score

s - mean

s - min

s - max

- mean

- min

- max

Agent

- mean

AMP

150

0.44

106

36

172

9.36

5.60

13.40

BRD

5

0.94

51

38

66

4.76

4.20

5.40

CLB

1

0.99

6

6

6

1.20

1.20

1.20

COM

250

0.38

92

8

174

2.23

1.00

3.30

INF

1

0.97

30

30

30

1.70

1.70

1.70

SMT

60

0.80

44

10

70

4.63

3.10

7.20

SIM

90

0.60

39

11

72

44.20

29.10

62.10

Table 21 shows tweet and retweet rates for the every kind of agents. We calculate the average
values based on a simulation consisting of ten ticks. ‘Retweeted’ values indicate how many times agent
tweets were further retweeted by other agents. We observe highest ‘retweeted’ value levels for
broadcaster agents (249.8 retweets of content generated by an average broadcaster). Similarly,
broadcaster real-life Twitter accounts belong to influential media groups and their tweets are usually
retweeted in high volumes as well. Celebrity agent tweets are retweeted on average 70 times, which is
also in line with real-life retweeting patterns of tweets generated by popular politicians or celebrities.
Interestingly, simple bot tweets are not at all retweeted by other agents and the mean of retweeted
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messages that originate from smart bot accounts are on average retweeted below six times. On top of
that, simulated influencer agent tweets are retweeted on average 55 times, which also reflect retweet
trends among real-life social media influencers.
Table 21 Tweet and Retweeted Rates by Agent Type

Kind of

Retweeted

Retweeted

Retweeted-

Tweets -

Tweets -

Tweets -

Agent

- mean

- min

max

mean

min

max

AMP

2.22

0.20

10.60

2.27

1.30

4.00

BRD

249.80

216.10

284.80

9.36

8.60

11.10

CLB

70.10

70.10

70.10

2.70

2.70

2.70

COM

0.82

0.00

6.50

1.40

0.50

2.30

INF

55.30

55.30

55.30

2.40

2.40

2.40

SMT

5.40

1.40

22.60

2.16

1.10

3.00

SIM

0.00

0.00

0.00

25.50

18.00

36.40

Figure 16 presents a visual representation of tweet rates for the following agents: ‘celebrity’
(CLB), ‘influential user’ (INF), ‘broadcaster’ (BRD), ‘amplifier’ (AMP), ‘commentator’ (COM) and
‘sophisticated bot’ (SMT) and ‘simple bot’ (SIM). Simple bots (not pictured) tweet most actively (on
average 25 tweets) whereas commentators are least active when it comes to tweeting.

Figure 16 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem
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Figure 17 presents a visual representation of retweet activity for the defined agents. Highest
retweeting activity characterizes simple bots that tweet aggressively (on average 45 retweets), followed
by broadcasters that are known as content creators. Commentators have the lowest rates of retweeting
activity.

Figure 17 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem

Figure 18 discusses retweet rates of tweets generated by each of the agent kind. Simple bot
agent tweets are not retweeted at all and amplifier, commentator and smart bot tweets get around 10
retweets each. Tweets generated by influencer and celebrity agents receive above 50 retweets each. The
highest number of retweets collect broadcaster tweets (between 200 and 300 retweets/ tick).
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Figure 18 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem

Figure 19 presents follower rates for the agent ecosystem. The range of commentator follower
values is the highest among all agent followers: the minimum number of commentator agent followers
falls below 10 and the maximum number of commentator followers exceeds 170 agents. The model
reports the highest mean of follower number for amplifiers: on average, over 110 agents were following
amplifier agent kind. On average, simple bots report 40 followers.

Figure 19 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem

The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network is shown in Figure 20. The different types of
agents are named with varying three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an
integer. The edges are the following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.
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Figure 20 A Zoom-in on TRMP Agent with a Circle of Followers and Followees

Figure 21 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets (Left) and Trump’s Tweets (Right)

Figure 21 shows an output of a simulation of TRMP agent tweet retweets (left) and real Donald
Trump account retweets (right). Both figures present: 1) the total amount of retweets tweets garner in
seven ticks (model simulation) and five days (Donald Trump real Twitter data), 2) the number of
retweets the tweets gather on a day-to-day basis. One can distinguish between three categories of tweets
(“Rocket Ships”, “Jets” and “Blimps”), depending on the number of retweets every tweet generated.
Simulated Trump account generates 27 tweets (3 Rocket Ships, 15 Jets and 9 Blimps) in a simulation
that takes 10 days/ ticks and consists of 1000 agents.
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Table 22 presents the simulated network statistics divided into days/ ticks. The table shows the
number of agents, tweets and followers in the 10-day simulation. The number of followers stays
unchanged within the whole course of simulation whereas the number of generated tweets in the
network increases from 0 on day 0 (tick 0) to 31671 tweets on day 9 (tick 9).
Table 22 Simulated Network Statistics

Day (tick)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

5.5

Followers
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366
62366

Tweets
0
3577
7230
10767
14275
17772
21209
24787
28192
31671

Users
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000

Model Validation

To validate the model we compare the propagation of TRMP agent tweets (retweet behavior) in a
network with SIM and SMT bots and after bots are removed from the model. First, we investigate to
what extent malicious accounts contribute to the amplification of tweets over the network. We collect
the statistics generated by Donald Trump agent (TRMP) tweets before the removal of malicious agents
following Donald Trump agent (TRMP). The proposed statistics are defined as follows: retweet count,
maximum retweet count, minimum retweet count, mean retweet, retweet standard deviation and retweet
median. As a next step actual intervention takes place – malicious accounts following Donald Trump
agent (TRMP) are removed from the simulated model. In the final step we analyze the two groups of
values generated before and after the simulation.
Similarly to the empirical findings presented in study one, we observe the dampening
amplitudes of retweet values. Also, we notice that retweeting patterns remain consistent, even after
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removal of the malicious bots. The number of retweets gets clearly reduced after the removal of
malicious bots from the simulation. Figure 22 presents TRMP account retweet rates before and after bot
removal.
Retweet Rates Before and After Bot Removal
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Retweet rates before bot removal

Retweet rates following 99% of SIM and 99% of SMT removal

Figure 22 TRMP Account Retweet Rates Before and After Bot Removal

For further verification we collect the retweet patterns of each of TRMP agent tweets before and after
the removal of 99% of bot agents observed in the model (the outputs are presented in Figure 23). We
observe that similar to real life retweeting behavior, the number of tweets with a high number of
retweets is significantly lower after the removal of malicious accounts. This observation helps in
establishing the fact that removal of malicious accounts has significant effect on retweeting behavior but
does not significantly alter overall network behavior.

Figure 23 Tale of TRMP Retweets Before (Left) and After 99% Bot Removal (Right)
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Bot removal has a severe impact on a network follower-following relationship. As we observe from
Figure 24, the total number of followers cumulatively in the network goes down significantly after we
remove bots from the network.
Network Followers Before an After Bot Removal
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0
Network followers before bot removal

Network followers after bot removal

Figure 24 Network Followers Before and After Bot Removal

As we observe in Figure 25, bot removal has also an impact on the amount of tweets that are generated
in the network. Before bot removal the network records over 62 thousand tweets and after 99 percent of
bots are removed from the network, the number of tweets in the network reduces to 44 thousand per
network simulation.

Network tweets
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Figure 25 Network Tweets Before and After Bot Removal
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5.6

Discussion

This chapter serves as a next step in an on-going stream of research on the implications of malicious
accounts on social media outlets. The chapter first reviews past research that deploys agent-based
modeling to investigate phenomena on the Twitter platform. Next, the study discussed in the chapter
proposes a simulated agent-based model of social media model ecosystem. The model consists of six
types of legitimate agents: (1) ‘influencer,’ (2) ‘celebrity,’ (3) ‘broadcaster,’ (4) ‘amplifier,’ (5)
‘commentator’ and (6) ‘viewers’ and two types of malicious agents: (1) ‘simple bots’ and (2)
‘sophisticated bots’. The simulation models agents’ behaviors and incorporates a communication
mechanism between the agents using preferential attachment rule.
The study captures the results of the defined agent-based simulation, presents statistics and
graphs and discusses the results. To validate the model the study compares the propagation of TRMP
agent tweets (retweet behavior) in a network with SIM and SMT bots and after bots are removed from
the model. Similarly to the empirical findings presented in study one, we observe the dampening
amplitudes of retweet values. Also, we notice that retweeting patterns remain consistent, even after
removal of the malicious bots.
Next chapter uses the proposed agent-based model to test a policy intervention that targets
malicious behavior. Using an agent-based model in this chapter we simulate scenarios which show how
policy interventions on social media outlets can help reduce malicious behavior.
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CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION OF THE AGENT-BASED MODEL
The goal of this chapter is to propose and test out hypothetical social network policy intervention
presenting four different levels of malicious account population. The proposed intervention can serve as
an input for policymakers to design effective policies against malicious actions on social media outlets.
When testing malicious accounts’ policy scenarios on a simulated agent-based model of a social
network, the study designs and applies a policy intervention with four different levels of population that
are based on network interventions process (Valente, 2012). Finally, the study discusses statistics that
present changes in agent behavior, depending on applied intervention scenarios.
Ruths and Ruths (2014) argue that in order to control of a complex network in an effective
manner, first one needs to understand what kind of network controls and how many of such controls are
required. The origin of a control and its characteristics has to be well understood before it is applied in a
complex network. Rahmandad and Sterman (2008) argue that outputs that are generated by model
simulations can help policymakers in creation of effective policies. The researchers argue that by
altering simulated model assumptions, policymakers can investigate the effectiveness of policy
interventions in real-life scenarios. In other words, interventions applied on agent-based models can help
understand what kind of policies affect agent behaviors or whether such policies have no impact on how
agents act in real-life. In a social media setting, policy interventions have a potential to reduce the
activity of bots and reshape the mechanism in which malicious messages are populated (Gorwa and
Guilbeault, 2018).
The following study focuses on the following research questions: (1) How do policy-based
interventions affect tweeting and retweeting behaviors of malicious social media users? and (2) Can we
adequately evaluate policy alternatives using agent-based modeling and simulation? It applies examples
of social media policies on simulated scenarios based on documented past examples of disruptive
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behavior on social media. Next, the study analyzes the consequences of the introduction of the defined
policy intervention on the behavior of simulated agents.
6.1

Literature Review

Past literature on network interventions whose aim is to contain malicious behavior on social media is
limited. More commonly, social media has served as an environment to exercise educational
interventions on targeted groups to promote health (Cheston et al., 2013, Korda & Itani, 2013, Gold et
al., 2012), prevent diseases (Tso et al., 2016, Gabarron et al., 2018) or treat illnesses (Alvarez-Jimenez et
al., 2014). The literature review that we present below, focuses on investigating past research on
network interventions applied on social networks and complex networks in general.
Valente (2012) argues that network interventions’ goal is to “use social networks or social
network data to generate social influence, accelerate behavior change, improve performance, and/or
achieve desirable outcomes among individuals, communities, organizations, or populations.” Ruths and
Ruths (2014) defines the following characteristics of complex networks control process. First, to
implement a successful network control mechanism, one needs to select specific nodes whose
adjustments result in a desired indirect adjustment of the network. Secondly, applied controls should be
time-dependent to effectively bring a network to a desired state. Moffit (2001) distinguishes between
three classes of policy interventions on social interactions. First class of interventions aims at forcible
changes in the structure of a network group such as reassignment of individuals of one group to another
group. Second class of interventions focusses on alteration of a membership in a subset group. As a
result, the expected effect is to influence the entire member group. Third class of policy interventions
proposed by Moffit aims at influencing the social norms that affect all group members.
Aral (2012) recommends the application of network interventions in a social media context in
order to contain negative user behaviors on social media outlets or to support positive behaviors among
social media users. Lazer et al. (2018) defines two types of interventions that can be used to target fake
news propagation. First, the researchers propose changes in the structure of the social network to prevent
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a user from being exposed to fake news. Second, the researchers advise to involve social media users in
the intervention process so that they could critically evaluate the news on social media in terms of their
authenticity. Harris et al. (2014) proposes node removal on the Twitter network to address malicious
consequences of astroturfing as a part of network interventions strategy.
Pagoto et al. (2016) analyze the process of introducing behavioral interventions in social media
environment. The authors also list common problems that are related to interventions in social media
context. Gorwa and Guilbeault (2018) discuss the consequences of bot-related policy interventions and
argue that to ensure efficient bot-policy interventions, one first needs to possess thorough understanding
of bot behavior. Taylor et al. (2018) identify 10 types of network interventions (e.g., algorithmic changes
to the social media platform structures, fact checking and flagging or enhanced reporting) whose aim is
to address malicious behavior on social media.
6.2

Proposed Intervention Scenarios

The primary purpose of the proposed intervention presenting four different levels of malicious account
population is to understand the impact of selected social media policies on the simulated network of
social media user agents. Table 23 presents the list of proposed intervention scenarios and describes the
characteristics of analyzed network behavior. In every intervention scenario, the study captures (1) the
information about the state of a simulated network before a proposed intervention, (2) targeted agents,
(3) proposed intervention scenario and (4) planned action after every intervention step.
Table 23 Proposed Policy Intervention Scenarios

Scenario 1

Targeted

Targeted

Model

Agent

Intervention

Planned Action

Simulated

Simple bot

Remove 25% of simple

Collect and analyze

social

(SIM) and

bot (SIM) and 25% of

proposed statistics

media

sophisticated

sophisticated bot (SMT)

related to network

agent-based

bot (SMT)

population

behavior after every

network

agents

step
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Table 23 (Continued)

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Targeted

Targeted

Intervention

Planned Action

Model

Agent

Simulated

Simple bot

Remove 50% of simple

Collect and analyze

social

(SIM) and

bot (SIM) and

proposed statistics

media

sophisticated

sophisticated bot (SMT)

related to network

agent-based

bot (SMT)

population

behavior after every

network

agents

Simulated

Simple bot

Remove 75% of simple

Collect and analyze

social

(SIM) and

bot (SIM) and

proposed statistics

media

sophisticated

sophisticated bot (SMT)

related to network

agent-based

bot (SMT)

population

behavior after every

network

agents

Simulated

Simple bot

Remove 99% of simple

Collect and analyze

social

(SIM) and

bot (SIM) and

proposed statistics

media

sophisticated

sophisticated bot (SMT)

related to network

agent-based

bot (SMT)

population

behavior after every

network

agents

step

step

step

The proposed policy intervention scenarios are synthetic in nature. They aim at analyzing how
the removal of malicious agents such as simple bots (SIM) and sophisticated bots (SMT) influences the
behavior of social media network. Table 24 captures account and network statistics to measure the effect
of proposed intervention scenarios.
Table 24 Account and Network Statistics

Metric

Formula

Active users per kind

Number of agents active in the network

Number of followers

Total number of followers in the network

Number of follower

Mean, minimum and maximum values of follower users per agent kind

agents
Agent reputation

#follower/ (#follower+#following) – statistics captured for each agent
kind
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Table 24 (Continued)

Metric

Formula

Tweet count

Mean, minimum and maximum values of tweets per agent kind

Number of retweeted

Mean, minimum and maximum values of retweeted agent tweets per

tweets

agent kind

Retweet count

Mean, minimum and maximum values of retweets per agent kind

6.3

Intervention Results

Scenario 1: Removal of 25% SIM & 25% SMT Bots
First scenario focuses on the removal of 25 percent of the initial simple bot (SIM) agent population and
25 percent of the initial smart bot (SMT) agent population from the simulated network. After the
removal of bots, we run the simulation to check how the network behaves after the policy intervention.
We collect the statistics and discuss them as below.

Figure 26 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 26 presents an output of a simulation of TRMP agent tweet retweets. The figure presents: 1) the
total amount of retweets tweets garner in seven ticks (days) and 2) the number of retweets the tweets
gather on a day-to-day basis. One can distinguish between three categories of tweets (“Rocket Ships” – 3
tweets indicated in red color, “Jets” – 12 tweets marked in yellow and “Blimps” – 12 tweets marked in
blue), depending on the number of retweets every tweet generates. Overall, simulated Trump account
generates 27 tweets in a simulation that takes 10 days/ ticks and consists of 1000 agents. Bot removal
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clearly impacts retweeting pattern. One can observe that the number of tweets with a high number of
retweets reduces after bot removal. In the same time, there are no tweets that reach more than 50 tweets.
The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network after the removal of 25% of initial ‘simple bot’ and
‘smart bot’ population is shown in Figure 27. The different types of agents are named with varying
three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an integer. The edges are the
following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.

Figure 27 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 28 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 28 presents a visual representation of tweet rates for the following agents: ‘celebrity’ (CLB),
‘influential user’ (INF), ‘broadcaster’ (BRD), ‘amplifier’ (AMP), ‘commentator’ (COM) and
‘sophisticated bot’ (SMT). Similarly, to a network with initial number of bots, simple bots tweet most
actively (on average 25 tweets) whereas commentators were least active when it comes to tweeting.
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Figure 29 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 29 presents a visual representation of retweet activity for the defined agents. Highest retweeting
activity characterizes simple bots that retweet aggressively (on average 47 retweets), followed by
amplifiers. Celebrities and influencers have the lowest rates of retweeting activity.

Figure 30 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 30 presents follower rates for the agent ecosystem. The range of commentator follower values is
the highest among all agent followers: the minimum number of commentator agent followers falls below
10 and the maximum number of commentator followers exceeds 170 agents. As compared to the model
simulation before bot removal where the highest mean of followers characterizes amplifiers (see Figure
19), the model reports the highest mean of follower number for commentators. On average, over 100
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agents are following commentator agent kind. In the same time, simple bots report on average 39
followers.

Figure 31 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 25% Bot Removal

Figure 31 discusses retweet rates of tweets generated by each of the agent kind. Similarly to a network
prior to bot removal, simple bot agent tweets are not retweeted at all. Amplifier, commentator and smart
bot tweets get around 10 retweets each. Tweets generated by influencer and celebrity agents receive
above 50 retweets each. Similarly to a network before bot removal, the highest number of retweets is
collected by a broadcaster tweets (between 200 and 300 retweets/ tick). However, the range of retweets
after bot removal is much lower (125 – 210 retweets) as compared to 200-300 retweets before bot
removal.

Scenario 2: Removal of 50% SIM & 50% SMT Bots
Second scenario focuses on the removal of 50 percent of the initial simple bot (SIM) agent population
and 50 percent of the initial smart bot (SMT) agent population from the simulated network. After the
removal of bots, we run the simulation to check how the network behaves after the policy intervention.
We collect the statistics and discuss them as below.
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Figure 32 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 50% Bot Removal

Figure 32 presents an output of a simulation of TRMP agent tweet retweets. The figure present: 1) the
total amount of retweets tweets garner in seven ticks (days) and 2) the number of retweets the tweets
gather on a day-to-day basis. One can distinguish between three categories of tweets (“Rocket Ships”,
“Jets” and “Blimps”), depending on the number of retweets every tweet generated. Simulated Trump
account generates 27 tweets in a simulation that takes 10 days/ ticks and consists of 1000 agents. The
range of retweets continues to dampen as compared to the network with 25% of bots removed. Once we
remove 50% of the initial number of bots, the highest retweet level reaches 35 retweets.
The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network after the removal of 50% of initial ‘simple bot’ and
‘smart bot’ population is shown in Figure 33. The different types of agents are named with varying
three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an integer. The edges are the
following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.
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Figure 33 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 50% Bot Removal

The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network after the removal of 50% of initial ‘simple bot’ and
‘smart bot’ population is shown in Figure 33. The different types of agents are named with varying
three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an integer. The edges are the
following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.

Figure 34 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal

Figure 34 presents a visual representation of tweet rates for the following agents: ‘celebrity’ (CLB),
‘influential user’ (INF), ‘broadcaster’ (BRD), ‘amplifier’ (AMP), ‘commentator’ (COM), and
‘sophisticated bot’ (SMT). Similarly to a network with initial number of bots, simple bots tweet most
actively (on average 25 tweets) whereas commentators tweet least actively. Bot removal does not have
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any impact on agent tweeting behavior. There is almost no difference in tweeting patterns of the
analyzed agents.

Figure 35 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal

Figure 35 presents a visual representation of retweet activity for the defined agents. Highest retweeting
activity characterizes simple bots that tweet aggressively (on average 47 tweets), followed by amplifiers.
Influencers have the lowest rates of retweeting activity.

Figure 36 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal

Figure 36 presents follower rates for the agent ecosystem. The range of commentator follower values is
the highest among all agent followers: the minimum number of commentator agent followers falls below
10 and the maximum number of commentator followers exceeds 160 agents. Similarly to the model
98

before bot removal, after we remove 50% of bots the model reports the highest mean of follower number
for amplifiers: on average, over 110 agents were following amplifier agent kind. In the same time simple
bots are on average followed by 39 other agents.

Figure 37 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 50% Bot Removal

Figure 37 discusses retweet rates of tweets generated by each of the agent kind. Simple bot agent tweets
are not retweeted at all and amplifier, commentator and smart bot tweets get around 10 retweets each.
Tweets generated by influencer and celebrity agents receive above 30 retweets each. The highest number
of retweets collect broadcaster tweets (between 110 and 170 retweets/ tick). In the same time, tweets
generated by simple bot agents are not retweeted at all.

Scenario 3: Removal of 75% SIM & 75% SMT Bots
Third scenario focuses on the removal of 75 percent of the initial simple bot (SIM) agent population and
75 percent of the initial smart bot (SMT) agent population from the simulated network. After the
removal of bots we run the simulation to check how the network behaves after the policy intervention.
We collect the statistics and discuss them as below.
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Figure 38 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 38 presents an output of a simulation of TRMP agent tweet retweets. The figure presents: 1) the
total amount of retweets tweets garner in seven ticks (days) and 2) the number of retweets the tweets
gather on a day-to-day basis. One can distinguish between three categories of tweets (“Rocket Ships”,
“Jets” and “Blimps”), depending on the number of retweets every tweet generated. Simulated Trump
account generates 27 tweets in a simulation that takes 10 days/ ticks and consists of 1000 agents. As
compared to Figure 21 that shows retweet trends before bot removal, retweet values after we remove
75% of bots from the network are much lower (only one tweet collects more than 35 retweets).
The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network after the removal of 75% of initial ‘simple bot’ and
‘smart bot’ population is shown in Figure 39Figure 27. The different types of agents are named with
varying three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an integer. The edges are the
following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.
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Figure 39 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 40 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 40 presents a visual representation of tweet rates for the following agents: ‘celebrity’ (CLB),
‘influential user’ (INF), ‘broadcaster’ (BRD), ‘amplifier’ (AMP), ‘commentator’ (COM) and
‘sophisticated bot’ (SMT). Similarly to a network with initial number of bots, simple bots tweet most
actively (on average 25 tweets) whereas commentators are least active when it comes to tweeting.
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Figure 41 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 41 presents a visual representation of retweet activity for the defined agents. Highest retweeting
activity characterizes simple bots that tweet aggressively (on average 49 retweets), followed by
amplifiers and broadcasters. Influencers have the lowest rates of retweeting activity.

Figure 42 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 42 presents follower rates for the agent ecosystem. The range of commentator follower values
before and after the removal of 75% of bots does not change. The minimum number of commentator
agent followers falls below 10 and the maximum number of commentator followers exceeds 160 agents.
The model reports the highest mean of follower number for amplifiers: on average, over 110 agents were
following amplifier agent kind. In the same time, simple bot agents report on average 38 followers.
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Figure 43 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 75% Bot Removal

Figure 43 discusses retweet rates of tweets generated by each of the agent kind after 75% of the initial
amount of bots are removed from the system. Simple bot agent tweets are not retweeted at all and
amplifier, commentator and smart bot tweets get around 10 retweets each. Tweets generated by
influencer and celebrity agents receive below 30 retweets each. The highest number of retweets collect
broadcaster tweets (around 80 retweets).

Scenario 4: Removal of 99% SIM & 99% SMT Bots
Fourth scenario focuses on the removal of 99 percent of the initial simple bot (SIM) agent population
and 99 percent of the initial smart bot (SMT) agent population from the simulated network. After the
removal of bots we run the simulation to check how the network behaves after the policy intervention.
We collect the statistics and discuss them as below.
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Figure 44 Tale of TRMP Simulation Retweets After 99% Bot Removal

Figure 44 shows an output of a simulation of TRMP agent tweet retweets. The figures presents: 1) the
total amount of retweets tweets garner in seven ticks (days) and 2) the number of retweets the tweets
gather on a day-to-day basis. One can distinguish between three categories of tweets (“Rocket Ships”,
“Jets” and “Blimps”), depending on the number of retweets every tweet generated. Simulated Trump
account generates 27 tweets in a simulation that takes 10 days/ ticks and consists of 1000 agents. We
observe a significant impact of 99% of bot removal on the rate of retweets of TRMP agent tweets. The
tweets are retweeted at the highest 30 times (as compared to over 65 times before bot removal). The
majority of tweets are retweeted less than 20 times each.

Figure 45 A Zoom-in on ‘Celebrity User’ Agent After 99% Bot Removal
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The zoom-in on the TRMP agent and its’ network after the removal of 25% of initial ‘simple bot’ and
‘smart bot’ population is shown in Figure 45. The different types of agents are named with varying
three-character metasyntactic variables (such as “Foo”), along with an integer. The edges are the
following relationships, which determine the message propagation pathways.

Figure 46 Tweet Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal

Figure 46 presents a visual representation of tweet rates for the following agents: ‘celebrity’ (CLB),
‘influential user’ (INF), ‘broadcaster’ (BRD), ‘amplifier’ (AMP), ‘commentator’ (COM) and
‘sophisticated bot’ (SMT). Similarly to a network with initial number of bots, simple bots tweet most
actively (on average 26 tweets) whereas commentators were least active when it comes to tweeting.

Figure 47 Retweeting Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal
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Figure 47 presents a visual representation of retweet activity for the defined agents. Highest retweeting
activity characterizes simple bot that retweets aggressively (on average 27 times), followed by amplifiers
(on average amplifier agent retweets 9 times). Celebrity has the lowest rate of retweeting activity (1
retweet/ tick).

Figure 48 Follower Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal

Figure 48 presents follower rates for the agent ecosystem. The range of commentator follower values is
the highest among all agent followers: the minimum number of commentator agent followers falls below
10 and the maximum number of commentator followers exceeds 120 agents. The model reports the
highest mean of follower number for commentators: on average, over 80 agents are following
commentator agent kind. In the same time, simple bot agents report on average 17 followers.
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Figure 49 Retweeted Rates for the Agent Ecosystem After 99% Bot Removal

Figure 49 discusses retweet rates of tweets generated by each of the agent kind. Simple bot agent tweets
are not retweeted at all. Amplifier and commentator tweet retweets are also close to 0. Smart bot,
influencer and celebrity tweets receive around 30 - 35 retweets each. The highest number of retweets
collect broadcaster tweets (between 100 and 175 retweets/ tick).
6.4

Discussion

This study deploys agent-based model of a social media network and tests out a policy intervention with
four different levels of malicious account population that focuses on removing malicious bots from the
network. First intervention removes 25 percent of social bot agents and 25 percent of sophisticated bot
agents. During the second simulation we remove 50 percent of the original amount of social bots and
smart bots. Third intervention removes 75% of the original amount of bots whereas the fourth
intervention removes 99% of bot accounts from the model. After each intervention we run a simulation
and collect statistics. This section presents the outcomes of the study and discusses the consequences of
bot removal.
The analysis of policy intervention simulation outputs indicates that the removal of bot accounts
from a social media network impacts network behavior. Taking out malicious accounts has a significant
impact on the number of retweets garnered by users who generally have a high number of retweets
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(Figure 50 presents mean retweet count for broadcaster, celebrity and influencer agents). A spike in
mean retweeted count between the removal of 75% and 99% of bots that characterizes broadcaster (in
Figure 50), amplifier and communicator (in Figure 51) agent types is caused by the preferential
attachment rule implemented in the agent-based model. The diagrams showcase the limitation of the
currently implemented model. The model generates the number of retweets based on the total number of
agents of its class. After the removal of 99% of bots, the number of agents of the bot class equals 1. If
the remaining bot is a highly retweeting bot, that leads to a scenario where the tweets of other kinds of
users get retweeted with higher probability leading to an aberrant situation as presented in the figures
below.
Mean Retweeted Count (BRD, CLB, INF)
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After 50% Bot
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Removal
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Removal

Mean retweeted count (CLB)

Mean retweeted count (INF)

Figure 50 Mean Retweeted Count (BRD, CLB, INF)

There is hardly any impact of bot removal on amplifier and commentator agents’ tweet retweets (see
Figure 51). These agents in general receive much less retweets as compared to broadcaster, celebrity and
influencer agent accounts.
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Mean Retweeted Count (AMP, COM)
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As pictured in Figure 52, the number of followers decreases for amplifiers, influencers, broadcasters and
commentators. Such a decreasing trend is not observed for celebrity agent types whose follower
numbers increase after 99% of bot removal.
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Figure 52 Mean Followers Count per Agent Kind

Figure 53 indicates that malicious account removal does not have any significant impact on agents’
retweeting activity. Irrespectively of the level of malicious account removal we do not observe any
visible trend or alteration in the retweeting behavior of different kinds of agents.
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CHAPTER 7. DISSERTATION IMPLICATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter presents the implications, findings and contributions of this dissertation. Also, it discusses
limitations of presented work and planned future research. First, the chapter discusses research-related
implications and presents practical implications brought by this dissertation. Second, it elaborates on
governance policy implications that are supported by the findings of the proposed intervention. Third,
the chapter presents the limitations of this dissertation and the proposed agent-based model and
discusses possible opportunities for future research. Finally, the chapter elaborates on future research
that extends the scope of this dissertation.
The presented doctoral dissertation discusses four studies that focus on the problem of the
propagation of malicious news on social media. The dissertation first investigates how the removal of
malicious agents that follow accounts owned by influential people (e.g., celebrities or politicians)
impacts the popularity of tweets posted by such accounts. Second study focuses on the investigation of
malicious account behaviors that Twitter tagged as malicious and removed from the network. The study
analyzes five datasets released by Twitter that are related to Twitter manipulations originating from
Russia, Iran, Spain (Catalonia) and Venezuela. Third study follows the design science approach (Hevner
et al., 2004) and proposes an artifact in a form of a simulated agent-based model of a social media
network. The proposed agent-based model is based on past literature review and the findings presented
in second study. Fourth study applies a policy intervention to investigate the effectiveness of malicious
account policy implementations that aim at controlling malicious behavior on social media outlets. The
proposed policy intervention presented in study four is based on the social network intervention process
(Valente, 2012) and diffusion of innovations theory.
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The contribution of this dissertation is as follows: first, it serves as a next step towards a better
understanding of the impact of malicious actions on social media outlets. Second, the dissertation
proposes an artifact in the form of an agent-based model that simulates social media network
environment. The proposed simulation captures the complexity of agent behaviors and models the
dynamic interactions between the social media agents. Finally, the dissertation tests out sample social
media policy intervention that target malicious behavior. Presented agent-based model and applied
policy intervention serve as a first step to a creation of a comprehensive tool that governance policy
representatives can use to simulate policy intervention scenarios that target malicious behavior on social
media.
7.1

Research Implications

The research presented in this dissertation offers several contributions to the IS field. First, the
dissertation provides a better understanding of the different kinds of actors that are present in the social
media ecosystem. Second, the proposed model captures the dynamic relationship between different
kinds of agents that are active on social media. Such interactions between agents lead to an emergent
network behavior which we then capture and analyze in Chapter 6. Third, to our knowledge this
dissertation presents one of the first agent-based models whose role is to proactively evaluate social
media policies and analyze their effects. The model also allows to investigate policy alternatives which
help to control malicious behavior on social media.
First study presented in the dissertation contributes to the field of research on malicious actions
on social media. The study investigates the implications of malicious account removal on the
propagation of posts. The study proposes an analysis of tweets posted by Donald Trump and organizes
tweets into three categories (Rocket Ships, Jets and Blimps). The analysis shows that the distribution of
tweet categories, before and after malicious accounts’ cleanup, does not change significantly. However,
there is clearly a narrowing in the amplitude of retweets and favorites of impacted tweets. The study
backs this finding with a sign paired t-test that confirms a statistically significant difference in the mean
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count of retweets and favorites before and after the cleanup. This makes intuitive sense if the Twitter
account removals reduce the number of bots (serving as amplifiers), as well as somewhat inactive
accounts at the other end of the spectrum, thereby narrowing the retweet range.
Second study discussed in Chapter 4 explores the types of malicious behaviors on social media.
The study focuses on the investigation of malicious account behaviors that Twitter tagged as malicious
and removed from the network. The study extracts six different measures of malicious account behavior
from the datasets released by Twitter. The features extracted capture the following account
characteristics: (1) account reputation, (2) account tweeting frequency, (3) age of account, (4) account
activity score, (5) average like count and (6) average retweet count. Due to the high heterogeneity of
malicious accounts’ behaviors, the study employs a DBSCAN and K-means cluster analysis to group the
accounts according to the mentioned account characteristics. In the four presented datasets the study
identifies clusters of malicious accounts that apply different tactics of propagating misinformation on a
Twitter platform. Identified clusters provide a better understanding of malicious account behavior in
populating misinformation. The result of the analysis shows that malicious accounts whose behavior
resembles human-like actions are able to survive longer in the network and populate malicious messages
more effectively than the bot-like representatives. The study presents evidence that malicious accounts
originating from different countries apply highly distinct strategies to pollute the social network with
malicious tweets. Another finding shows that tweets originating from countries that use both bot-like
and human-like accounts as propagators are more popular than tweets originating from countries that
predominantly rely on high numbers of aggressively tweeting bots.
Third study is based on the design science approach (Hevner et al., 2004) and follows the Action
Design Research (ADR) approach (Mullarkey and Hevner, 2019). The study is based on the findings of
the second study and is supported by an extensive review of existing literature on malicious accounts’
behaviors. The contribution of this study is that it proposes, builds and evaluates an IS artifact (Hevner
et al., 2004) in a form of an agent-based model of a simulated Twitter network in which malicious and
legitimate agents’ behaviors are populated. The study presents social media model ecosystem, defines
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the model’s agents and their behaviors and explains a communication mechanism between the simulated
agents. The study contributes to an on-going stream of research on the implications of malicious
accounts on social media outlets.
Fourth study evaluates the effectiveness of a social media policy intervention that targets
malicious behavior. The study analyzes four intervention scenarios in which malicious agents are
subsequently removed from the model. The agent-based model of social media environment presented in
this dissertation allows the analysis of simulated scenarios that aim at controlling malicious behavior.
The intervention showcases a potential of the proposed model for a deployment as a social media policy
evaluations tool. The model provides an understanding of consequences related to an application of
governance policies on social media network behavior.
7.2

Practice and Governance Policy Implications

Practical implications of this dissertation are as follows. Our findings contribute to the field of policy
making on social media platform and offer new insights for social media network administrators and
users.
First, the dissertation summarizes the research conducted in the last couple of years on the types
of social network users and offers and in-depth analysis of the malicious and legitimate types of
behaviors that characterize social media users. Such review can be helpful as a startup point for social
media companies (e.g., advertisers) who want to understand behavior patterns of their potential target
audience. Government agencies that are interested in policing social media users’ behavior can find the
presented review of social media user types useful. Similarly, a clustering analysis of malicious Twitter
actor characteristics presented in this dissertation provides an interesting insight into a variety of types of
country-specific malicious behaviors.
Second, the designed IS artifact (the simulated agent-based model of a social media network)
helps social media platforms evaluate malicious behavior polices in a cost- and time-effective way.
Having in mind that policymakers often operate under limited resources and are forced to make tradeoffs
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between the details and breadth of tested models (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008), the proposed social
network agent-based model offers a cost-effective policy testing platform solution. Agent-based
simulation provides an opportunity to test a variety of intervention scenarios in a time-effective manner.
The intervention applied on the agent-based model help determine agents’ actions that result from
application of different types of policies. The model has a potential to also test complex interventions
which would not be possible to execute in a real-life environment. What is more, the model can be
relatively quickly and easily readjusted and recalibrated to suit the changing characteristics of social
media networks. Finally, the findings of policy intervention simulations can help social media platforms
design effective malicious accounts’ policies that address a variety of behaviors of social media users.
7.3

Limitations

This dissertation has several limitations. First, a clustering analysis of malicious types of Twitter actors
presented in the second study focusses on accounts originating from only four countries: Iran, Russia,
Spain (Catalonia) and Venezuela. Therefore, in order to make wide-ranging inferences that go beyond a
given set of described countries, the study would need to take additional country-related datasets into
consideration.
Second, the complexity of the described simulated Twitter network model is limited and does
not consider all possible ways in which malicious accounts can communicate on social media platforms
(e.g., the studies in this dissertation do not simulate any use of graphical and textual content of malicious
messages). Also, for the purpose of this study the variety of malicious and legitimate agents is narrowed
down to the most important types of users that play a role in the spread on information on social media
outlets. The simulation showcases the behavior of the most common type of social media actors and in
the same time omits actors that are rare in a real-life social media setting.
Third limitation of this dissertation is related to the topology of the defined agent-based model.
To ensure the simplicity of the analyzed simulated environment, third and fourth study presented in this
dissertation assume that solely preferential attachment shapes the relationships between the agent nodes.
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As argued by some researchers (Holme, 2019, Johnson et al., 2014, Muchnik et al., 2013, Li et al.,
2013), preferential attachment is not the only component that defines social relations in online
environments. Other formation mechanisms such as least effort, direct reciprocity or indirect reciprocity
should be also taken into consideration.
Finally, the last limitation of this dissertation is related to the fact that policy intervention
simulations that this dissertation discusses, address only a narrow set of intervention scenarios and do
not exhaust the full spectrum of malicious agents’ behaviors.
7.4

Future research

Future research will further develop the agent-based model presented in this dissertation and propose a
simulation that is adapted to future changes on social media platforms. The characteristics of social
media constantly changes, and new social media tools and solutions are introduced on the market.
Natural consequence of the changing types of behaviors on social media outlets would be to introduce
new types of policy interventions that can be tested with the use of the proposed agent-based model. An
example of such policy intervention could be based on Study 1. We plan to simulate Donald Trump
account network behavior to understand how the removal of direct followers of Donald Trump account
impact the network.
Also, future research can diversify further the individual heterogeneity of defined agents to
reflect ongoing social media environment changes. We plan to expand the agent-based model presented
in this dissertation both in terms of the number and types of the agents (current simulation study deploys
1000 agents) and other attributes such as graphical and textual context of malicious messages. Also,
future research will introduce additional network mechanisms that shape relationships between agents.
For example, apart from retweeting mechanism that the study in this dissertation incorporates, future
research will introduce Twitter favorites (likes) into the simulation model.
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7.5

Conclusion

This dissertation focusses on the problem of malicious accounts actions on social media. First, the
dissertation analyzes types of malicious behavior that can be found on social media outlets and discusses
the characteristics of such behavior. Second, the dissertation incorporates the identified types of
malicious behaviors followed by legitimate human-owned accounts into a simulated agent-based model
of a social media network. With the theoretical basis of diffusion of innovations theory and preferential
attachment theory this dissertation proposes an artifact in a form of an agent-based simulation of a
Twitter network. The simulated model defines a social media model ecosystem, its agents and their
behaviors and explains a communication mechanism between the simulated agents. The study deploys
preferential attachment theory when modeling account-to-account connection rules between agents. To
validate the model we compare the propagation of TRMP agent tweets (retweet behavior) in a network
with SIM and SMT bots and after bots are removed from the model. We investigate to what extent
malicious accounts contribute to the amplification of tweets over the network. Similarly to the empirical
findings presented in study one, we observe the dampening amplitudes of retweet values. Also, we
notice that retweeting patterns remain consistent, even after removal of the malicious bots. The number
of retweets gets clearly reduced after the removal of malicious bots from the simulation.
Last study presented in this dissertation uses the proposed agent-based model to test policy
intervention that target malicious behaviors. Next, the study deploys a simulation to investigate policy
intervention that aim at controlling malicious behavior on social media outlets. The study applies the
social network intervention process (Valente, 2012) which is based on the diffusion of innovations
theory (Rogers, 2003). The social network intervention process informs the way in which the study
defines policy interventions designed to minimize the impact of malicious accounts on information
exchange on Twitter.
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APPENDIX 1 CLUSTERING OF TWITTER ACCOUNTS – CALCULATIONS
This appendix presents key computations and statistics developed and analyzed in second study. The
tables present computations characterizing each of the analyzed country data: Spain (Catalonia), Iran,
Russia and Venezuela. For every country dataset we calculate descriptive statistics of identified features
such as age of account, days tweeted, total tweets, account reputation, total like count, total retweet
count, average like count, average retweet count, tweet frequency and activity score. We also calculate
threshold values of identified features that help us later investigate the differences in malicious behaviors
in each of the analyzed countries.
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia)
Total

Total

Avg

Avg

Age of

Days

Total

Account

like

retweet

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

tweeted

tweets

reputation

count

count

count

count

frequency

score

413.40

54.81

138.85

0.31

458.31

526.28

1.57

2.34

0.26

0.13

deviation

621.51

100.07

326.20

0.20

2,110.54

3,075.82

9.82

18.04

0.26

0.10

1/2 mean

206.70

27.41

69.43

0.15

229.15

263.14

0.79

1.17

0.13

0.07

3/2 mean

620.10

82.22

208.28

0.46

687.46

789.42

2.36

3.51

0.39

0.20

Mean
Standard

Table A2 Threshold Values of Identified Features – Spain (Catalonia)
Avg

High

Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

>620.10

>0.5

>2.36

>3.51

>10

>0.67

>0.79

>1.17

>3

>0.33

Medium

>206.7
=<620.1

~0.5

=<2.36

=<3.51

=<10

=<0.67

Low

=<206.7

<0.5

=<0.79

=<1.17

=<3

=<0.33
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Table A3 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Spain (Catalonia)

Age of

Account

Avg like

Avg retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 1

M

L

L

L

L

L

Cluster 2

H

H

H

H

L

L

Cluster 3

L

L

L

L

L

L

Table A4 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Iran
Total

Avg

Avg

Age of

Days

Total

Account

Total like

retweet

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

tweeted

tweets

reputation

count

count

count

count

frequency

score

475.13

132.22

1722.77

0.40

2331.15

1272.70

3.02

0.83

3.59

0.33

deviation

543.28

218.44

11744.68

0.23

12057.13

7473.24

19.13

3.95

9.43

0.27

1/2 mean

237.57

66.11

861.39

0.20

1165.57

636.35

1.51

0.42

1.79

0.16

3/2 mean

712.70

198.33

2584.16

0.59

3496.72

1909.05

4.53

1.25

5.38

0.49

Mean
Standard

Table A5 Threshold Values of Identified Features –Iran
Avg

High

Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

>712.70

>0.5

>4.53

>1.25

>10

>0.67

>1.51

>0.42

>3

>0.33

>237.57
Medium

=<712.70

~0.5

=<4.53

=<1.25

=<10

=<0.67

Low

=<237.57

<0.5

=<1.51

=<0.42

=<3

=<0.33

Table A6 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Iran
Avg
Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 1

H

L

L

L

L

L

Cluster 2

M

L

L

L

L

M

Cluster 3

L

L

L

L

L

L

Cluster 4

H

M

L

M

M

L

Cluster 5

L

M

H

M

L

L

136

Table A6 (Continued)
Avg
Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 6

H

M

L

L

L

L

Cluster 7

M

M

M

M

M

M

Cluster 8

M

H

H

H

L

L

Cluster 9

H

H

M

H

H

H

Cluster 10

L

L

M

M

H

H

Cluster 11

M

L

L

L

L

L

Table A7 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Russia
Total

Total

Avg

Avg

Age of

Days

Total

Account

like

retweet

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

tweeted

tweets

reputation

count

count

count

count

frequency

score

360.00

28.61

2138.35

0.42

1574.78

964.92

2.99

0.94

6.60

0.12

deviation

323.55

96.06

19428.78

0.16

18897.62

8007.65

48.98

13.62

53.24

0.21

1/2 mean

180.00

14.30

1069.18

0.21

787.39

482.46

1.49

0.47

3.30

0.06

3/2 mean

540.00

42.91

3207.53

0.63

2362.17

1447.38

4.48

1.41

9.89

0.18

Mean
Standard

Table A8 Threshold Values of Identified Features –Russia
Avg

High

Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

>540

>0.5

>4.48

>1.41

>10

>0.67

>1.49

>0.47

>3

>0.33

>180
Medium

=<540

~0.5

=<4.48

=<1.41

=<10

=<0.67

Low

=<180

<0.5

=<1.49

=<0.47

=<3

=<0.33
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Table A9 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Russia
Avg
Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 1

M

L

L

L

L

L

Cluster 2

L

L

M

M

H

H

Cluster 3

M

M

L

L

L

L

Cluster 4

M

H

H

H

L

L

Cluster 5

H

H

L

M

H

H

Table A10 Descriptive Statistics of Identified Features – Venezuela
Total

Total

Avg

Avg

Age of

Days

Total

Account

like

retweet

like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

tweeted

tweets

reputation

count

count

count

count

frequency

score

41.53

27.33

2044.60

0.25

521.35

473.99

0.24

0.21

54.38

0.67

deviation

90.04

48.69

3521.04

0.23

1675.93

1644.34

0.40

0.35

64.74

0.33

1/2 mean

20.76

13.67

1022.30

0.12

260.68

236.99

0.12

0.10

27.19

0.34

3/2 mean

62.29

41.00

3066.91

0.37

782.03

710.98

0.37

0.31

81.57

1.01

Mean
Standard

Table A11 Threshold Values of Identified Features – Venezuela
Avg

High

Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

>62.29

>0.5

>0.37

>0.31

>10

>0.67

>0.12

>0.10

>3

>0.33

>20.76
Medium

=<62.29

~0.5

=<0.37

=<0.31

=<10

=<0.67

Low

=<20.76

<0.5

=<0.12

=<0.10

=<3

=<0.33

Table A12 Threshold Values of Identified Features L/M/H – Venezuela
Avg
Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

Cluster 1

H

H

M

M

H

M

Cluster 2

M

L

M

M

H

M
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Table A12 (Continued)
Avg

Cluster 3

Age of

Account

Avg like

retweet

Tweet

Activity

account

reputation

count

count

frequency

score

M

L

L

L

H

L
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‘TRMP’ ACCOUNT AGENT RETWEET STATISTICS

APPENDIX 2

The following appendix presents computations related to TRMP account tweet retweet rates in five
simulated network intervention scenarios: (1) prior to bots removal, (2) following 25% of SIM and 25%
of SMT removal (3) following 50% of SIM and 50% of SMT removal, (4) following 75% of SIM and
75% of SMT removal, (5) following 99% of SIM and 99% of SMT removal.
Table A13 ‘TRMP’ Account Agent Retweet Statistics

Tweet #

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

before bot

following 25%

following 50%

following 75%

following 99%

removal

of SIM and

of SIM and

of SIM and

of SIM and

25% of SMT

50% of SMT

75% of SMT

99% of SMT

removal

removal

removal

removal

1

28

19

10

7

4

2

53

41

17

17

16

3

51

9

4

3

10

4

20

16

11

10

10

5

60

30

23

17

23

6

6

3

5

14

12

7

9

19

14

12

6

8

29

38

30

21

20

9

11

9

5

4

33

10

17

14

17

10

10

11

48

32

35

14

22

12

6

4

4

3

15

13

17

20

17

8

6

14

37

39

34

19

19

15

7

22

25

2

12

16

25

18

17

11

7
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Table A13 (Continued)

Tweet #

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

Retweet rates

before bot

following 25%

following 50%

following 75%

following 99%

removal

of SIM and

of SIM and

of SIM and

of SIM and

25% of SMT

50% of SMT

75% of SMT

99% of SMT

removal

removal

removal

removal

17

44

44

29

15

9

18

7

4

3

11

3

19

16

18

14

2

15

20

36

34

31

6

24

21

7

42

3

2

23

22

17

12

10

16

4

23

44

32

19

16

17

24

27

8

6

13

11

25

14

11

14

16

5

26

54

26

23

18

6

27

2

2

2

2

2
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APPENDIX 3

AGENT INTERVENTION STATISTICS

The following appendix presents computations related to each agent kind behavior statistics in five
simulated network intervention scenarios: (1) prior to bots removal, (2) following 25% of SIM and 25%
of SMT removal (3) following 50% of SIM and 50% of SMT removal, (4) following 75% of SIM and
75% of SMT removal, (5) following 99% of SIM and 99% of SMT removal.
Table A14 Policy Intervention Statistics - Amplifier (AMP)

Before

After 25%

After 50%

After 75%

After 99%

Intervention

Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal

Mean retweets count

9.36

9.24

9.47

9.49

8.76

Min retweets count

5.60

5.10

5.80

4.90

4.20

Max retweets count

13.40

13.40

13.50

13.90

12.40

Mean retweeted count

2.22

1.95

1.43

1.61

2.41

Min retweeted count

0.20

0.00

0.10

0.00

0.34

Max retweeted count

10.60

8.40

5.00

6.10

34.40

Mean followers count

105.75

98.45

100.91

96.29

66.92

Min followers count

36.00

36.00

37.00

36.00

22.00

Max followers count

172.00

172.00

162.00

153.00

119.00

Table A15 Policy Intervention Statistics - Broadcaster (BRD)

Before
Intervention
Mean retweets count

After 25%
After 50%
After 75%
After 99%
Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal

4.76

4.82

4.68

4.78

4.68

Min retweets count
Max retweets count
Mean retweeted count

4.20
5.40
249.80

3.90
6.10
175.28

3.30
6.60
137.82

3.30
6.80
98.90

3.60
6.20
129.88

Min retweeted count

216.10

125.90

112.00

75.60

106.70

Max retweeted count
Mean followers count

284.80
50.80

204.60
37.60

166.40
41.00

126.80
35.60

170.60
24.80
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Table A15 (Continued)

Before
Intervention
Min followers count
Max followers count

38.00
66.00

After 25%
After 50%
After 75%
After 99%
Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal
31.00
53.00

14.00
63.00

11.00
58.00

11.00
43.00

Table A16 Policy Intervention Statistics - Celebrity (CLB)

Before
Intervention

After 25%
After 50%
After 75%
After 99%
Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal

Mean retweets count
Min retweets count
Max retweets count

1.20
1.20
1.20

0.90
0.90
0.90

1.60
1.60
1.60

1.40
1.40
1.40

1.00
1.00
1.00

Mean retweeted count
Min retweeted count
Max retweeted count
Mean followers count
Min followers count

70.10
70.10
70.10
6.00
6.00

54.30
54.30
54.30
19.00
19.00

38.80
38.80
38.80
6.00
6.00

32.10
32.10
32.10
33.00
33.00

33.80
33.80
33.80
20.00
20.00

Max followers count

6.00

19.00

6.00

33.00

20.00

Table A17 Policy Intervention Statistics - Commentator (COM)

Before
Intervention

After 25%
After 50%
After 75%
After 99%
Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal

Mean retweets count
Min retweets count
Max retweets count
Mean retweeted count

2.23
1.00
3.30
0.82

2.18
0.50
3.80
0.59

2.20
0.80
3.60
0.50

2.20
0.90
3.40
0.49

2.16
0.70
3.60
0.77

Min retweeted count
Max retweeted count
Mean followers count

0.00
6.50
91.74

0.00
4.70
95.58

0.00
3.50
88.80

0.00
2.90
83.52

0.00
14.50
66.83

Min followers count
Max followers count

8.00
174.00

8.00
174.00

11.00
165.00

9.00
161.00

8.00
121.00
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Table A18 Policy Intervention Statistics - Influencer (INF)

Before
Intervention

After 25%
After 50%
After 75%
After 99%
Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal Bot Removal

Mean retweets count
Min retweets count

1.70
1.70

0.90
0.90

1.10
1.10

0.80
0.80

1.20
1.20

Max retweets count
Mean retweeted count

1.70
55.30

0.90
52.70

1.10
33.90

0.80
19.80

1.20
12.80

Min retweeted count

55.30

52.70

33.90

19.80

12.80

Max retweeted count
Mean followers count
Min followers count

55.30
30.00
30.00

52.70
26.00
26.00

33.90
31.00
31.00

19.80
26.00
26.00

12.80
21.00
21.00

Max followers count

30.00

26.00

31.00

26.00

21.00
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APPENDIX 4

PERMISSION DOCUMENTS

---------- Forwarded message --------Od: AIS eLibrary <elibrary@aisnet.org>
Date: pt., 22 lis 2019 o 11:45
Subject: RE: Request for AIS articles to be included as a part of dissertation
To: Agnieszka Onuchowska <aonuchowska@mail.usf.edu>

Hello Agnieszka,

Thank you for contacting AIS. As the first author of the articles, you do not require permission from
AIS.

Best,

Aretha

From: Agnieszka Onuchowska <aonuchowska@mail.usf.edu>
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2019 3:58 PM
To: AIS eLibrary <elibrary@aisnet.org>
Subject: Request for AIS articles to be included as a part of dissertation
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EXTERNAL Email - Do not click links or open attachments unless you confirm the content is safe.

Dear Team,

My name is Agnieszka Onuchowska, I am a doctoral candidate at the University of South Florida and a
current AIS member.

I would like to ask for your permission to have the articles, which I published at AMCIS, ECIS and ICIS
conferences as a first author, used as part of my PhD thesis.

I would be grateful for your feedback.

Kind regards,

Agnieszka

Agnieszka Onuchowska

Doctoral Candidate and Graduate Research Assistant

Information Systems Decision Sciences Department
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USF Muma College of Business
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